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Abstract
Chapter 1 develops a model of parallel trading of corporate securities (shares, bonds)
and derivatives in which a large trader can sometimes profitably acquire securities and the
corporate control rights inherent therein for the sole purpose of reducing the corporation’s
value and gaining on a net short position in the corporation created through off-setting
derivatives. At other times, the large trader profitably takes a net long position in the cor-
poration and exercises its control rights to maximize the corporation’s value. This strategy
is profitable if and because other market participants cannot observe the large trader’s or-
ders and hence cannot predict how the control rights will be exercised. In effect, the large
trader is benefitting from trading on private information about payoff uncertainty that the
large trader itself creates. This problem is most likely to manifest in transactions that
give blocking powers to small minorities, particularly out-of-bankruptcy restructurings and
freezeouts, and is bound to become more severe when derivatives trade on an exchange
rather than over-the- counter.
Chapter 2 investigates in parallel the cross-country determinants of crime and punish-
ment in the largest possible sample of countries with data on homicides, victimization by
iii
Abstract iv
common crimes (ICVS), incarceration rates, and the death penalty. While models with
a small number of plausible covariates predict much of the variation of homicide and in-
carceration rates between major developed countries, they predict only one seventh of the
actual US incarceration rate.
Chapter 3 probes into the pervasive correlations between legal origins, modern regu-
lation, and economic outcomes around the world. Where legal origin is exogenous, it is
almost perfectly correlated with another set of potentially relevant background variables:
the colonial policies of the European powers that spread the "origin" legal systems through
the world. The chapter attempts to disentangle these factors by exploiting the imperfect
overlap of colonizer and legal origin, and looking at possible channels, such as the structure
of the legal system, through which these factors might influence contemporary economic
outcomes. It find strong evidence in favor of non-legal colonial explanations for economic
growth. For other dependent variables, the results are mixed.
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Chapter 1
Derivatives Trading and Negative Voting
1.1 Introduction
Securities regulators, practitioners, and legal commentators worry that derivatives may
provide shareholders and creditors incentives to destroy value in their corporation.1 The ba-
sic concern is that if shareholders or creditors own a sufficient amount of off-setting deriva-
tives such as put options or credit default swaps (CDS), any losses on their shares or debt
will be more than off-set by the corresponding gains on their derivatives ("over-hedging").
In this case, shareholders and creditors benefit by using the control rights inherent in their
shares or debt to reduce the corporation’s value ("negative voting"). An important question
that is generally not considered, however, is whether it would ever be profitable for share-
holders or creditors to acquire so many derivatives in the first place. After all, any gains to
shareholders and creditors come at the expense of their counterparties on their derivative
contracts. These counterparties would therefore prefer not to sell the derivatives, or only
at a price that compensates them for the future payouts, thus depriving shareholders and
creditors of any profit in the overall scheme.
This paper argues that over-hedging and negative voting can indeed be profitable with
1Regulators: See, e.g., Securities and Exchange Commission, Concept Release on the U.S. Proxy System,
75 Fed. Reg. 42,982, 43,017-20 (July 22, 2010); Committe of European Securities Regulators, Public
Statement of the Market Participants Consultative Panel CESR/10/567 (July 5, 2010), at 3-4. Practitioners:
See, e.g., Soros (2010) and Sender (2009) (quoting from David Einhorn’s letter to investors). Commentators:
See in particular Martin and Partnoy (2005) and Hu and Black (2007, 2008).
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a minimal and realistic degree of investor heterogeneity and asymmetric information. The
paper presents a model of parallel trading of corporate securities (shares, bonds) and deriva-
tives in which a large, strategic trader interacts with liquidity traders and competitive mar-
ket makers. The key assumptions are that market makers cannot observe the large trader’s
orders directly, and cannot infer them from aggregate order flow because of fluctuating liq-
uidity trades. In this case, market makers cannot predict how control rights will be exercised
if the large trader only over-hedges some of the time. Prices will reflect some probability
of negative voting, allowing the large trader to benefit from its private information about its
own trades and expected vote. In effect, the large trader is exploiting private information
about payoff uncertainty that the large trader itself creates. The large trader benefits at the
expense of liquidity traders, whose trades provide camouflage to the large trader.
The assumption that counterparties cannot observe the large trader’s positions and
hence its incentives for exercising control rights seems to capture many situations in real
world derivative markets. This is obvious to the extent derivatives are traded on an ex-
change and centrally cleared. Such anonymous trading has long been the standard for eq-
uity options and is now generally mandated by the Dodd-Frank Act. But even when trading
occurs over-the-counter (OTC), traders’ positions and strategies are confidential and remain
largely hidden from their counterparties (e.g., Avellaneda and Cont 2010 for the CDS mar-
ket). To be sure, any market participant in an OTC market knows the identity of it direct
counterparty, at least post-trade. But since dealers routinely enter into chains of hedging
transactions (e.g., Stulz 2010), the ultimate buyer of protection will usually be unaware of
the identity of the ultimate seller, and vice versa.2 In addition, investors can conceal their
overall position even from their direct counterparties by splitting trades among many of
them.
The foregoing assumption distinguishes the present paper from Bolton and Oehmke
(2011) and Campello and Matta (2012). These very insightful papers analyze the effect of
CDS availability on renegotiation in an incomplete contracting model of debt with strategic
default. In their model, creditors’ ability to hedge their exposure to the debtor with CDS
2Chen et al. (2011) report that dealers often do not hedge large trades right away but only in the course
of several days. Unless default of the reference entity is imminent, however, this does not change the basic
point here.
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contracts increases creditors’ bargaining power in renegotiation. This reduces the incidence
of strategic default and therefore has the beneficial effect of increasing the debt capacity
of the firm; at the same time, overinsurance may lead to an inefficiently high frequency
of bankruptcy. Crucially, these papers assume that the CDS protection sellers observe the
exact position of the buyer-creditor, who therefore never gains from dealing in CDS as
such. While this assumption is justified in many situations, the asymmetric information
scenario considered in the present paper seems better suited to other situations, particularly
for exchange trading of derivatives. In effect, a parallel reading of the aforementioned
papers and the present one demonstrates the crucial importance of CDS market structure
for discussing the costs and benefits of these derivatives.
The idea that a large trader can create uncertainty about the security payoff and profit on
a net long or a net short position is also present in Brav and Mathews (2011). In their model,
however, the only traded assets are shares, and the only way to create a short position is by
shorting the shares. To retain voting power while being short the shares, i.e., to over-hedge,
the hedge fund acquires naked votes from other shareholders through the share lending
market. Brav and Mathews assume that the hedge fund can do so for free up to a certain
amount, and not at all beyond that amount.3 This assumption does not work outside the
share lending market, however, because the hedge fund will have to pay for votes bundled
with a cash-flow into a security. Moreover, trading in derivatives presents additional profit
opportunities for the hedge fund.
The model closest to the present paper is parallel work by Zachariadis and Olaru (2011).
Theirs is a model of parallel trading of debt and equity, in which a hedge fund may build a
long position in a firm’s debt only to reject a restructuring and profit from a short position in
the firm’s equity. The main differences to the present paper are twofold. First, Zachariadis
and Olaru add another strategic player, namely the firm manager who makes a take-it-
or-leave-it restructuring offer to debtholders. Second, they consider only binary trading
choices in debt and equity, i.e., the hedge fund can only choose whether to trade, but not
how much. Qualitatively, they reach results similar to the present paper.
3Cf. Christoffersen et al. (2007), who document that the average vote does indeed sell for a price of zero
in the share lending market.
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Empirical work on negative voting has been severely limited by the lack of investor-
level position and voting data. Papers that have looked at correlations between the avail-
ability of CDS and corporate bankruptcy have found mixed results, depending on the time
period studied and the construction of the sample (Peristiani and Savino 2011; Bedendo et
al. 2012). In the future, regulators may gain access to the requisite data for more probative
empirical studies. In the meantime, gaining a firm theoretical understanding of the question
remains of pressing importance.
1.2 The Economic Mechanism
To facilitate understanding of the formal model presented in the next section, this sec-
tion will lead with a verbal description of the main economic mechanism at work.
Imagine that two assets trade in a market with three types of participants. The traded
assets are bonds (publicly traded debt claims) and credit insurance on those bonds. The
market participants are a hedge fund, numerous benign traders such as pension funds and
mutual funds, and numerous competitive financial institutions that act as market makers.
The benign traders buy and sell random quantities regardless of price for exogenous pur-
poses such as fulfilling redemptions or purchases, portfolio rebalancing, or compliance with
fund risk policies. Competition between market makers ensures that the benign traders al-
ways obtain prices equal to the value that is expected given publicly available information.
The precise structure of trading will be discussed later.
After trading, the value of the bonds – and hence the payouts on credit insurance con-
tracts – will be determined by a bondholder vote on a proposed restructuring. For illustra-
tive purposes, assume that the bonds will be worthless if creditors reject the restructuring,
but pay the full face amount if creditors accept the restructuring. Conversely, credit insur-
ance will pay out nothing if the restructuring succeeds, and will pay the full insured amount
if the restructuring fails. Naturally, bondholders will accept the restructuring unless they
own more than full credit insurance on their bonds, i.e., unless they are over-hedged.
To keep things simple, assume that only one market participant – the hedge fund – is
ruthless enough to consider over-hedging and negative voting. That is, only the hedge fund
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would purchase more credit insurance than bonds and attempt to block the restructuring.
One can imagine that reputational or regulatory concerns prevent other market participants
from considering this strategy. The probability that the hedge fund would be able to block
the restructuring is increasing in the number of bonds that the hedge fund owns. The will-
ingness of the hedge fund to block the restructuring depends only on the hedge fund’s rela-
tive holdings of bonds and credit insurance: if the hedge fund owns more credit insurance,
the hedge fund will attempt to block the restructuring; otherwise, it will not.
These assumptions imply that the expected value of the bonds – and the expected pay-
outs on the credit insurance – depends entirely on how many bonds and how much credit
insurance the hedge fund ends up owning. The problem for market makers is that they do
not know the hedge fund’s trades and ultimate position, and hence cannot determine exactly
how much the bonds or credit insurance will be worth. The crucial but realistic assumption
is that market makers cannot observe the hedge fund’s trades. In particular, the hedge fund
can conceal its trades by placing orders through different brokers. Market makers are able
to observe aggregate market turnover – through information repositories, or exchange data
–, but these aggregate numbers compound the hedge fund’s trades with the random trades
of benign traders.
The best that market makers will be able to do is to form expectations of the hedge
fund’s positions based on the aggregate trading data. Before discussing this inference prob-
lem, however, it is instructive to consider what would happen if market makers’ expecta-
tions did not depend on trading volume. Consider two extreme cases. If market makers
believed that the hedge fund will block the restructuring, the bond price would be zero
(recall that competition between market makers will push prices to expected value), while
credit insurance would cost exactly the insured amount. In this case, the hedge fund could
make (unlimited) profits by buying (all the) bonds for free, selling (unlimited amounts of)
insurance, and not preventing the restructuring. At the other extreme, if market makers
believed that the hedge fund will not block the restructuring, the bond price would be equal
to its face amount, while credit insurance would be costless. In this case, the hedge fund
could make unlimited profits by buying unlimited amounts of credit insurance for free and
just enough bonds to block the restructuring.
To analyze how market makers are going to form beliefs about the hedge fund’s po-
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sitions from aggregate market data, it is necessary to specify the trading process in more
detail. The model considers the simplest possible market with only one round of trading.
First, the hedge fund and liquidity traders submit their orders (buys and sells). Second,
market makers observe aggregate orders. Third, market makers fill all these orders at com-
petitive prices, i.e., prices that correspond to their best estimate of the probability that the
hedge fund will block the restructuring.
In this setup, market makers beliefs about the hedge fund’s position will be based on
their observation of aggregate orders in combination with their prior beliefs about the dis-
tribution of benign traders’ orders. In particular, when the demand for bonds or derivatives
is extremely high or low (this includes negative demand), market makers will assume with
high probability that this demand emanates mostly from the hedge fund if and because
benign traders never submit such large orders. For more moderate values, market makers
will not know if they result from relatively high demand by the hedge fund and relatively
low demand by the benign market participants, or vice versa. In this case, market makers
must assign probability estimates based on the relative likelihood of these two scenarios,
and prices will reflect weighted average values.
These average prices enable the hedge fund to profit from mixing both strategies. Some-
times the hedge fund profits by over-hedging and blocking the restructuring. At other times,
the hedge fund gains by not over-hedging and letting the restructuring proceed because it
can buy the bond at a price discount, and sell credit insurance at a price premium, that
reflect the possibility of the restructuring being blocked. To be sure, the hedge fund cannot
predict benign traders demand. If high (low) demand by the hedge fund coincides with high
(low) demand by benign traders, market makers can infer the hedge fund’s positions and
hence accurately predict bond and insurance payoffs. In this case, the hedge fund does not
make any profits. When high hedge fund demand coincides with low demand by benign
traders and vice versa, however, the hedge fund makes a trading profit. In effect, the hedge
fund is trading on private information on its own value-relevant strategy.
Where do the hedge fund’s profits come from? Competitive market makers always trade
for prices that are equal to expected value, given their information. Consequently, market
makers make zero profits or losses. The hedge fund’s profits come out of the pockets of the
benign traders. They tend to sell many derivative contracts when pay-outs on the contracts
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will turn out to be high relative to the contracts’ price, and they tend to buy many contracts
when pay-outs will turn out to be low relative to the contracts’ price.
As a final note, the size of the hedge fund’s positions depends on trading costs such
as commissions, bid-ask spreads, or margin requirements, and the variability of benign
traders’ demand. The higher the variability of benign traders’ demand, the bigger the
stakes that the hedge fund can hope to buy without being discovered, and hence the larger
the trading profits that the hedge fund can make. The higher the trading costs, the more
conservatively the hedge fund will trade. In the extreme, trading costs can be so high as to
make it impossible for the hedge fund to make any profits. In this sense, a more “liquid”
market facilitates over-hedging and negative voting.
1.3 The Formal Model
1.3.1 Model Setup
This subsection introduces the setup of the model: the two types of traded assets (secu-
rities and derivatives), the three types of market participants (hedge fund, liquidity traders,
and market makers), and trading including information. It concludes with some remarks
on this setup.
Timeline
The timeline of actions is as follows (details to follow in subsequent subsections):
1. The hedge fund and liquidity traders submit their orders.
2. The market makers observe only net market demand, which combines the hedge
fund’s and the liquidity traders’ orders. Based on this observation, market makers
update their beliefs about the expected value of the securities and derivatives. At
these values (prices), they fill all net orders.
3. Security holders choose between two actions by some voting mechanism.
4. Payoffs are realized.
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Traded assets
There are two traded4 assets with perfectly negatively correlated payoffs: securities,
which will throughout be denoted by the letter X , and derivatives, which will throughout
be denoted by the letter Y . If the security pays v, the derivative pays 1− v. Consequently,
the derivative can be interpreted as an insurance claim on the security. In particular, if the
security were a bond, the derivative could be a credit default swap; if the security were a
share, the derivative could be a total equity return swap.
The number of securities is normalized to one (of which infinitesimal divisions are
traded). The derivative is a synthetic asset; hence its net supply is zero but unlimited
amounts can be sold and bought. Short-selling is allowed for both derivatives and securities.
The security payoff v depends on a binary choice between two actions, which is deter-
mined by a vote of the security holders. For example, if the security is a bond, the choice
could be whether or not to agree to a proposed restructuring; if the security is a share,
it could be whether or not to agree to a merger. Normalize the payoff when the "right"
decision is taken to v = 1, and when the "wrong" decision is taken to v = 0.
Each security provides one vote; derivatives do not provide any votes.
Naturally, a rational, informed, and unhedged security holder would always vote for
the "right" decision in order to receive v = 1. As will be discussed in the next subsection
and the concluding remarks on the model setup, this is indeed what all security holders are
assumed to do. The one exception is the hedge fund if and because the hedge fund owns
more derivatives than securities, i.e., if the hedge fund owns securities but is over-hedged.
The hedge fund’s ability to block the "right" decision depends on whether the hedge fund’s
security-holding is above some voting threshold. The voting threshold is assumed to be a
random variable distributed on [0, 1] according to the continuous cdf F (·) with F (0) =
0 and F (1) = 1. The randomness captures unexpected variation in voter participation,
uncertainty arising from legal concerns, different formal thresholds for different types of
decisions, etc. The voting threshold is assumed to be independent of other exogenous
4"Trading" does not need to be understood literally in this model. In particular, it is possible that the
derivative is a contract that is sold over the counter. What matters is that there be an active market for the
contract in which various parties can act as sellers or buyers, which is true for many derivative markets.
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variables in the model, and it will be independent of any trading activity since it will be
only revealed after all trading occurs. Let x ≡ max {x|F (x) = 0} ≥ 0.
Market Participants
There are three types of risk-neutral market participants: liquidity traders, one hedge
fund, and competitive market makers.
Liquidity traders The liquidity traders do not act strategically. They exogenously trade
quantities x˜ and y˜ of securities and derivatives, respectively, where positive numbers indi-
cate that the liquidity traders are buying, and negative numbers indicate that they are sell-
ing. These trades are not sensitive to price, and the source of these trades is not modelled.
To motivate these trades and their price insensitivity, one may think of large institutional
investors and their regulatory constraints. For example, certain pension funds might be
forced to sell bonds following a credit downgrade of the borrower. Similarly, financial in-
stitutions might be forced to purchase credit default swaps on certain bonds they hold. Or
one may think of mutual funds having to liquidate part of their portfolio to meet redemption
requests.
Liquidity traders’ demand for derivatives, y˜, is stochastic (keeping in mind that the
"demand" can be negative). With probability (1− λ), the demand is low (y˜ = y), while
with probability λ, demand is high (y˜ = y¯). Define the difference between these demand
realizations as δ ≡ y¯ − y > 0.
For simplicity, liquidity traders’ demand for securities, x˜, is assumed to be constant.
Hedge fund The hedge fund does act strategically. Initially, the hedge fund does not hold
any securities or derivatives. It purchases quantities x and y of securities and derivatives,
respectively, taking into account the effect of its trades on the price (as explained below), its
own voting power, and its own voting incentives. As explained in the previous subsection,
holding x > x securities gives the hedge fund the voting power to implement the "wrong"
decision with probability F (x) > 0 . Of course, the hedge fund will only have an incentive
to use this power if y ≥ x. The hedge fund incurs a financing cost C (x, y) with C (0, 0) =
minx,y C (x, y) = 0, sign [C1 (x, ·)] = sign (x) and sign [C2 (·, y)] = sign (y).
Chapter 1: Derivatives Trading and Negative Voting 10
Market makers The market makers absorb any excess demand (xˆ, yˆ) ≡ (x˜+ x, y˜ + y).
Since they are risk-neutral, infinitesimally small, and in perfect competition with one an-
other, they purchase or sell these quantities at prices that equal expected value, as explained
in more detail below. Market makers have rational expectations, i.e. they update their be-
liefs about (x, y) upon observing the net demand of securities (xˆ, yˆ).
Remarks on the model setup
While the model shares some features and notation with Kyle (1984) and Kyle and Vila
(1991), it is fundamentally different in that there is no exogenous asymmetric information,
i.e., the hedge fund here does not have private information about noise trades. As in Brav
and Mathews (2011), the only asymmetric information pertains to the hedge fund’s own
strategy. Further differences include the addition of trading cost and a flexible specification
for the hedge fund’s ability to influence the value of the security. In particular, this means
that the addition of the second asset is not redundant in the sense that the model could not
be re-written in terms of the difference between trades in the two assets.
The model assumes that the hedge fund is able to acquire any amount x of securities that
it desires. In particular, this ability does not depend on the amount x˜ supplied by liquidity
traders. In reality, it may often be difficult or impossible to acquire large blocks of shares
or bonds. There are, however, many situations in which exogenous sales of securities x˜
are large, and the reader may restrict the applicability of the model to such situations. For
example, many institutional investors sell all their holdings of a bond if the bond’s credit
rating drops below investment grade (Da and Gao 2009). Moreover, in the model, an upper
bound on the amount x of securities that the hedge fund can acquire would not change the
hedge fund’s strategy, and the only change from the results presented below would be that
the hedge fund might have to settle for the upper bound rather than its preferred, higher
position (i.e., one would observe corner solutions).
Relatedly, the assumption that large purchases have no price impact beyond the prob-
ability update by the market makers is not literally true. To go back to the acquisition of
securities, it would presumably become harder and harder to find additional securities as
the hedge fund’s position grows, and this would be reflected in higher trading costs for
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larger positions. Mathematically, however, the assumption of a financing cost for the hedge
fund has the same effect as assuming increasing trading costs for larger blocks, so that
nothing substantive hinges on the assumption of constant prices conditional on the updated
probability.
Finally, it is a strong assumption that only the one hedge fund is ready to buy large
stakes, and to consider over-hedging its securities position and to vote the securities for
the "wrong" decision. This excludes, first, that any of the other market participants in the
model, namely individual market makers and liquidity traders, who must hold the remain-
ing supply of securities, would ever hold more derivatives than securities, or if they did,
that they nevertheless voted for the "right" decision. One justification for this could be
institutional, namely that reputational concerns or sheer apathy prevent market makers and
liquidity traders to vote for the "wrong" decision, or to over-hedge their securities position
in the first place. One can also view the model as an illustration of how "negative voting"
can interfere with the smooth operation of a liquid, perfect market for securities; in this
view, the true equilibrium would be more complicated, and the model merely illustrates
why the market cannot be perfect.
Second, the above assumptions rule out strategic competition with a second large player.
For example, one can imagine a second hedge fund trying to share the spoils, or to buy up
enough of the security at a low price to prevent the first hedge fund from ever winning a
vote for the "wrong" decision. From a practical point of view, however, adding another
strategic player would complicate the model but not eliminate the underlying economic
problem. For example, even if the security were trading at deep discount because of the
hedge fund’s presence, another large player could not necessarily profitably intervene by
buying up the entire supply of securities if and because that second large player incurs sim-
ilar financing cost as the first hedge fund. Moreover, even if the second large player could
profitably do this, then in expectation the price of the security would re-adjust to 1, so that
the strategy would end up being not profitable after all. Subsection 1.3.5 below states this
argument formally.
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1.3.2 Equilibrium Concept
In principle, the equilibrium concept employed here is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium,
including in particular subgame perfection and rational, Bayesian expectations. The above
assumptions on individual behavior, however, allow summarizing the strategic interaction
in two simple equilibrium conditions that greatly facilitate discussion of the results (cf.
Kyle 1984, 1985; Kyle and Vila 1991). The assumption that liquidity traders’ trades are
exogenous means that liquidity traders decisions need not be explicitly considered at all.
First, the assumption that market-makers act as competitive, risk-neutral price takers
and absorb any net demand (xˆ, yˆ) means that their behavior can be summarized by the
price function. The price function is in turn pinned down by market-makers’ rational ex-
pectations about the security’s payoff:
Efficient markets: for some θ (·, ·) , Py (xˆ, yˆ) = 1− Px (xˆ, yˆ) = θ (xˆ, yˆ) ∈ [0, 1] ,
where Px (xˆ, yˆ) is the price of securities, Py (xˆ, yˆ) is the price of derivatives, and θ (xˆ, yˆ) :
R2 → [0, 1] is a probability belief compliant with Bayes’ rule that the security will pay zero,
all conditional on observed net demand of securities and derivatives, (xˆ, yˆ). Some elements
of this efficient markets condition would not require rational expectations: The absence of
arbitrage alone would imply that derivative and security prices lie between zero and one
and sum to one because the two assets are perfectly negatively correlated, together always
pay one, and individually never pay less than zero or more than one. The requirement that
θ (·, ·) comply with Bayes’ rule, however, imposes important additional constraints that
will be discussed in subsection 1.3.3 below.
Second, the hedge fund only has two meaningful choice variables, namely its trades x
and y. That is, the hedge fund’s equilibrium strategy is captured by
Profit maximization: σ (x′, y′) > 0⇒ (x′, y′) ∈ arg max
(x,y)
Ey˜ [Π (x, y, θ (x+ x˜, y + y˜))] ,
where Π (x, y, θ) is the hedge fund’s profit given its choice of trades (x, y) and θ, and
σ (x, y) ∈ [0, 1] is the probability with which the hedge fund chooses trades (x, y). The
hedge fund’s choice of σ (x, y) will of course take into account the effect of its trades on
Chapter 1: Derivatives Trading and Negative Voting 13
prices, i.e., on the probability inference of the market makers, θ (xˆ, yˆ). In that sense, the
efficient market condition implies an inverse demand curve against which the hedge fund
maximizes.
In principle, the hedge fund also needs to choose its vote at the voting stage. This
choice, however, is trivially determined by its holdings of securities and derivatives. If
the hedge fund holds more securities than derivatives (x > y), it will vote for the "right"
decision. In the opposite case (x < y), it will vote for the "wrong" decision. To be sure,
mixing is possible if x = y, but this will never occur unless x = y = 0 because given
trading cost, it would not be profitable for the hedge fund (see proof of Lemma 1).
1.3.3 Equilibrium in the General Case
The equilibrium of the model depends principally on the hedge fund’s trading cost
function. If the costs are large, they outweigh any trading gains, such that abstention (x =
y = 0) is the hedge fund’s only viable strategy. On the other hand, if the hedge fund’s
costs are low, it always pays for the hedge fund to try its luck – to the extent noise trades
camouflage the hedge fund’s trade, market makers cannot be sure about whether the hedge
fund is long or short and must choose some intermediate price, at which the hedge fund
can turn a trading profit. Proposition 1 below states this formally; Lemma 1 prepares the
ground by setting forth the equilibrium inference function.
Lemma 1. One inference function sustaining all possible equilibria is
θeq (xˆ, yˆ) ≡

0 if xˆ− x˜ ≤ x or yˆ − y < xˆ− x˜
F (xˆ− x˜) if x < xˆ− x˜ < yˆ − y¯
max {0,min {F (xˆ− x˜) , θ∗ (xˆ, yˆ)}} otherwise
,
where θ∗ (xˆ, yˆ) ≡ F (xˆ−x˜)(1−λ)[(yˆ−y)−(xˆ−x˜)]+C(xˆ−x˜,yˆ−y¯)−C(xˆ−x˜,yˆ−y)
λ[(xˆ−x˜)−(yˆ−y¯)]+(1−λ)[(yˆ−y)−(xˆ−x˜)] .
Proof. (1) θ is fully pinned down by rational expectations at net market demand pairs (xˆ, yˆ)
that fully reveal the hedge fund’s voting power and incentives. There are two such cases.
First, as there is no noise in the securities market, low security demand xˆ = x+ x˜ ≤ x+ x˜
fully reveals that the hedge fund does not have the voting power to implement the "wrong"
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decision (x < x), and hence θ = 0. Second, as the amount of noise in the derivatives market
is limited, observed net demand yˆ puts bounds on the possible hedge fund trades and may
reveal that the hedge fund strictly prefers the "wrong" or the "right" decision. In particular,
if derivatives demand is sufficiently low relative to securities demand (yˆ < y + xˆ − x˜),
it is clear that even with low noise trader demand the hedge fund could not possibly have
acquired more derivatives than securities (y = yˆ − y˜ ≤ yˆ − y < xˆ− x˜ = x). In this case,
the hedge fund clearly strictly prefers the "right" decision, which will hence be adopted,
so θ = 0. A symmetric argument shows that θ = F (xˆ− x˜) if derivatives demand is
sufficiently high (yˆ > y¯ + xˆ − x˜) to reveal that the hedge fund will use all its power
(F (xˆ− x˜)) to implement the "wrong" decision.
(2) At other market demand pairs (xˆ, yˆ), θ can w.l.o.g. be set to equate expected hedge
fund profits for the two trades that could have generated this demand, namely
(
xˆ− x˜, yˆ − y)
(such that x ≤ y – a "short trade") and (xˆ− x˜, yˆ − y¯) (such that x ≥ y – a "long trade"),
truncated at the outer bounds of rationally possible beliefs, namely 0 and F (xˆ− x˜).
(a) For market demand pairs that are actually observed in a mixed equilibrium, this is
in fact the only θ consistent with equilibrium because in order to mix, the hedge fund must
be indifferent between the underlying long and short trades. For off equilibrium demand
pairs, setting market makers’ subjective off-equilibrium beliefs at this level achieves maxi-
mum "deterrence" of deviations from equilibrium (because at other values, either the long
or short deviation would be more profitable). Finally, no pure strategy equilibrium can ever
generate such market demand pairs (xˆ, yˆ) because the only possible pure strategey equilib-
rium is (0, 0), for which xˆ fully reveals that x = 0 ≤ x; at other pure strategies, the hedge
fund would incur trading cost without being able to make a trading profit because its voting
power and incentives are fully known and hence the hedge fund pays for the derivatives
and securities exactly what it expects to get out.
(b) Truncation is immaterial because where truncation occurs, both long and short prof-
its are negative with or without truncation, such that the hedge fund would not place the
corresponding trades in either case. Consider first truncation at θ = 0. For the long trade
(x ≥ y), expected profits (λθ [(xˆ− x˜)− (yˆ − y¯)]−C (xˆ− x˜, yˆ − y¯)) are negative at θ ≤ 0
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(recall that the only cases considered here have x > x ≥ 0, such that C (x, y) > 0).5 Thus
if equality of profits for long and short trades occurs at θ ≤ 0, both profits are negative at
that θ. But then profits for the short trade ((1− λ) [F (xˆ− x˜)− θ] [(yˆ − y)− (xˆ− x˜)]−
C
(
xˆ− x˜, yˆ − y)) must also be negative at θ = 0 because short profits are decreasing in θ.
The argument for upper truncation at F (xˆ− x˜) is symmetric.
(c) θ∗ equates profits for the long and short trades, i.e., θ∗ solves λθ [(xˆ− x˜)− (yˆ − y¯)]−
C (xˆ− x˜, yˆ − y¯) = (1− λ) [F (xˆ− x˜)− θ] [(yˆ − y)− (xˆ− x˜)]− C (xˆ− x˜, yˆ − y).
Briefly, the reasoning behind θeq is as follows. First, some market demand realizations
(xˆ, yˆ) fully reveal the hedge fund’s incentives, such that θ must be equal to 0 or F (xˆ− x˜),
as the case may be (the hedge fund’s voting power can always be inferred from market
demand because liquidity traders’ demand for securities x˜ is non-stochastic). Second, at
other market demand realizations, defining θeq to equate expected hedge fund profits from
the long and short trades that could generate this (xˆ, yˆ) sustains mixing if these are equilib-
rium trades, and optimally deters deviations if these are off-equilibrium trades.
Proposition 1. The hedge fund’s equilibrium (expected) profits are max {0, pi∗}, where
pi∗≡maxω pi(x,y),ω≡{(x,y)|x>x, y∈[x−δ,x]}
and
pi(x,y)≡F (x)λ(1−λ)(x−y)(y+δ−x)−λ(x−y)C(x,y+δ)−(1−λ)(y+δ−x)C(x,y)
λ(x−y)+(1−λ)(y+δ−x)
The hedge fund’s equilibrium strategies depend on pi∗:
(a) If pi∗ < 0, the unique equilibrium is for the hedge fund not to trade at all (x = y =
0).
(b) If pi∗ > 0, any strategy such that
∑
(x∗,y∗)∈arg maxω pi(x,y) [σ (x
∗, y∗) + σ (x∗, y∗ + δ)] =
1 and σ (x∗, y∗) > 0 ⇒ σ(x∗,y∗)
σ(x∗,y∗+δ) =
1−λ
λ
[
F (x∗)
θ∗(x∗+x˜,y∗+y¯) − 1
]
∀ (x∗, y∗) ∈ ω is an equilib-
rium; the equilibrium is unique if and only if arg maxω pi (x, y) is unique.
(c) If pi∗ = 0, any linear combination of (a) with strategy profile (b) is an equilibrium.
Proof. By construction, pi∗ coincides with the highest non-negative expected profit, if
5The economic reason is that long trading profits derive from misleading the market into thinking that the
"wrong" decision may be taken (θ > 0), the more the better.
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any, that the hedge fund can obtain from trades (x, y) ∈ ω given θeq, since pi (x, y) =
λ (x− y) θ∗ (x+ x˜, y + y¯)−C (x, y) coincides with Ey˜ [Π (x, y; θeq (·, ·)) | (x, y) ∈ ω] un-
less θeq is truncated, which only occurs where expected profits are negative (see part (2)(b)
of the proof of Lemma 1). The maximum pi∗ exists because pi is a continuous function
on the closed interval ω. Any trade (x∗, y∗) generating pi∗ – and the trade (x∗, y∗ + δ),
which yields identical profits by construction of θ∗ – will (strictly) dominate not trading
(x = y = 0) if pi∗ is (strictly) greater than zero; otherwise not trading strictly domi-
nates. If more than one trade generates pi∗, the hedge fund is indifferent between them
and can mix them in any proportion. Mixing optimal trade pairs ((x∗, y∗) , (x∗, y∗ + δ))
in the stated proportions ensures that θeq (x∗ + x˜, y∗ + y¯) = θeq
(
x∗ + x˜, y∗ + δ + y
)
=
F (x∗)(1−λ)σ(x∗,y∗+δ)
(1−λ)σ(x∗,y∗+δ)+λσ(x∗,y∗) = Pr (v = 0|xˆ, yˆ) is correct. If the hedge fund does not trade, the
inference θeq
(
x˜, y
)
= θeq (x˜, y¯) = 0 is correct because the hedge fund will not be able to
influence the decision, so Pr (v = 1|xˆ, yˆ) = 1.
It remains to be shown that only trades (x, y) ∈ ω need to be considered in the search
for a profitable trade. Given the inference function θeq, the hedge fund’s trading profits
are zero regardless of the noise realization unless x − δ ≤ y ≤ x + δ and x > x, and
thus expected profits for such trades are negative given positive trading costs.6 Moreover,
by construction (see proof of Lemma 1), θeq ensures that for each trade (x, y) such that
x < x ≤ y ≤ x + δ, there is a corresponding trade (x, y − δ) ∈ ω that yields equal
expected profits unless expected profits for both trades are negative.
Corollary 1. There always exists a non-zero cost function C (·, ·) such that a mixed equi-
librium exists.
Proof. If C (x, y) = 0 ∀ (x, y), then pi∗ = maxω F (x)λ(1−λ)(x−y)(y+δ−x)λ(x−y)+(1−λ)(y+δ−x) > 0. The proof then
follows by continuity of pi (·, ·;C (·, ·)) in C (·, ·).
6Regardless of the noise realization, trading profits are (x− y) θ (x+ x˜, y + y˜) = (x− y) · 0 = 0 if
y < x−δ, (y − x) [F (x)− θ (x+ x˜, y + y˜)] = (y − x) [F (x)− F (x)] = 0 if y > x+δ, and (x− y) ·0 =
(y − x) (0− 0) = 0 if x ≤ x.
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1.3.4 Equilibrium with quadratic cost, uniform voting threshold dis-
tribution, and symmetric liquidity trades
To gain further insight into the properties of the model’s equilibrium, this subsection
analyzes the special case
C (x, y) =
c
2
(
x2 + y2
)
,
F (x) = max {0,min {x, 1}} ,
λ =
1
2
,
where c > 0. Using Proposition 1, it is easy to verify that the hedge fund’s optimal
securities trade in this case is
x∗ =
δ
16c
together with either of
y∗1 = x
∗ − δ
2
, or
y∗2 = x
∗ +
δ
2
,
provided that 0 < δ ≤ 16c ≤ 2√2 (for larger c, expected profits from trading would
be negative, so abstention would be optimal; for larger δ ≤ 1+
√
1−32c2
2c
, the corner solution
x∗ = 1 and y∗1,2 = 1± δ2 entails).
Not surprisingly then, the hedge fund becomes more aggressive (x∗ increases) as the
market becomes noisier and hence provides more camouflage (δ increases), and as the costs
of trading decrease (c decreases). This translates into a higher unconditional probability
that the "wrong" decision will be adopted. With symmetric noise (λ = 1 − λ = 1
2
) and a
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unique trading equilibrium, this probability is
Pr (v = 0) = F (x∗)σ (x∗, y∗2)
=
F (x∗) (1− λ)σ (x∗, y∗2)
(1− λ)σ (x∗, y∗2) + λσ (x∗, y∗1)
= θeq
(
x∗ + x˜, y∗2 + y
)
=
δ
16c
(
1
2
− 2c
)
.
This is increasing in the amount of "noise" or demand fluctuation, δ, and decreasing in
the trading cost or market illiquidity, c. The liquidity traders’ trading losses δ
2
128c
(1− 4c)
are also increasing in the amount of "noise" or demand fluctuation, δ, and decreasing in the
trading cost or market illiquidity, c.
At least in this special case, the model therefore shows that increasing liquidity (c) and
market size (δ) aggravate the problem analyzed in this paper.
1.3.5 Multiple Hedge Funds
Explicitly modelling the interaction of multiple hedge funds is far from straightforward,
and will not be attempted here. As hinted above in subsection 1.3.1, however, one can
at least state that problems of negative voting would persist in the presence of multiple
strategic traders:
Corollary 2. Regardless of the number of hedge funds, the equilibrium x = y = 0 exists if
and only if pi∗ < 0.
Proof. If pi∗ ≤ 0 and market makers’ inference function is θeq, no individual hedge fund
can profitably deviate by trading, while market makers correctly infer that the possibility of
the "wrong" decision being adopted is zero. Conversely, if pi∗ > 0, then any one hedge fund
would be better off trading regardless of the inference function (recall that θeq minimizes the
maximum possible trading profit), so x = y = 0 cannot be an equilibrium. The presence of
other non-trading hedge funds is irrelevant to this argument.
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1.4 Discussion
This section considers economic and legal constraints that curtail over-hedging and
negative voting. In particular, the section explains why the problem is much more likely
to arise with derivatives than with alternative, more traditional hedges, what "natural" and
regulatory barriers currently limit the problem, and in which situations the problem is there-
fore most likely to manifest. It argues that the problem is likely to be most acute in out-
of-bankruptcy restructurings and freezeouts, which can be blocked by a relatively small
minority stake, and arguably legally so.
1.4.1 Derivatives vs. other hedges
The first question to ask is why over-hedging is specifically a problem of derivatives.
In principle, over-hedging can occur with any investment that is negatively related to the
shares or debt at issue. Some examples include parallel investments in competing firms,
parallel investments in both the acquiror and the target of a merger transaction, parallel
investments in different securities of the same firm, or selling short some amount of a
security while holding on to a smaller amount. These other investments, however, are either
not perfectly correlated with the shares or debt and hence represent higher risk, or they are
only available in particular situations, or they are available only in small quantities or at
higher cost, or all of the above. These shortcomings severely limit the facility, frequency,
and extent to which these other investments could enable over-hedging.
By contrast, derivatives are designed to be perfectly (negatively) correlated with the
payoffs of shares or debt. Many derivatives markets, such as those for equity options,
are highly liquid at all times. Even those that are not, such as single-name CDS, exhibit
liquidity spikes around key events when over-hedging is most profitable, such as changes
in credit outlook for CDS (Chen et al. 2011). In general, the rapid growth of derivatives
markets over the last decade or two means that derivatives are in principle available in high
volumes at low prices (spreads). It is not unusual that the face amount of derivatives written
on the shares or debt of an individual company exceeds the amount of shares or debt issued
by that company (Stulz 2010).
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1.4.2 Required control stakes
Even if derivatives are available, it might seem an implausible proposition to acquire
and over-hedge a voting majority (51%) of a corporation’s shares or publicly traded debt.
Such quantities of shares/debt and derivatives may not even be available on the market, and
if they were, could hardly be acquired in secret and without strongly affecting prices. For
shares, acquiring such quantities would also trigger disclosure and other obligations under
corporate and securities laws and, in most U.S. corporations, the “poison pill.”7
Many relevant decisions, however, can be affected by much smaller percentages of
shares or debt. One possibility is that an over-hedged shareholder or creditor joins forces
with some other constituency pursuing interests other than maximizing share or debt value,
such as a corporate insider.
More importantly, some corporate decisions provide blocking power to relatively small
minorities. In particular, out-of-bankruptcy restructurings tend to set acceptance thresh-
olds around 95%, providing blocking rights to 5% or even less of the outstanding debt.
Importantly, restructurings that do not bind all holders, such as a standard debt exchange,
do not constitute a credit event under the prevailing CDS documentation and hence do not
trigger settlement of the CDS; this may amplify the incentives for negative voting because
bankruptcy accelerates payment.8 Practitioners suspect that over-hedging and negative vot-
ing are common in out-of-bankruptcy restructurings.9 In addition to restructurings, small
stakes may be sufficient to affect freeze-out mergers. Majority-of-the-minority conditions
in freeze-outs can give blocking rights to as little as a few percent of the corporation’s
outstanding equity.10
7See in particular section 13(d) of the Exchange Act, which requires disclosure of equity ownership stakes
above 5% and arguably of any hedges relating thereto (cf. discussion in the next section), and section 16 of
the Exchange Act, which forces 10% shareholders to disclose their hedges (sec. 16(a)) and disgorge short-
swing trading profits (sec. 16(b)). Moreover, section 16(c) prohibits 10% shareholders from engaging in
short sales, and rule 16c-4 explicitly extends this to over-heding using puts, while they are a 10% shareholder,
thus outlawing any strategy of acquiring a voting stake first and over-hedging it later (but not the other way
around).
8Cf. Art. 4.7(a) of the 2003 ISDA Credit Derivative Definitions, as amended by the "Small Bang Proto-
col," available at http://www.isda.org/publications/pdf/July-2009-Supplement.pdf.
9Author’s conversation with the head of the restructuring practice of a major New York law firm.
10Such majority-of-the-minority conditions have been imposed by Delaware courts as a condition for ob-
Chapter 1: Derivatives Trading and Negative Voting 21
1.4.3 Legal constraints
At least in the U.S., current law only provides incomplete protection against over-
hedging and negative voting. With respect to formal voting, U.S. law arguably provides
some protection, but enforcement may be hindered by a lack of disclosure. Outside of
formal voting, negative voting and over-hedging are arguably entirely unregulated.
Under §1126(e) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, bankruptcy judges have the power to
disallow votes by a creditor “whose acceptance or rejection of [a reorganization] plan was
not in good faith.” In a recent decision, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District
of New York held, obiter, that this provision would justify disqualification of votes by over-
hedged creditors.11 Bankruptcy courts will generally not know, however, if creditors are
over-hedged. Current bankruptcy rules do not require disclosure of hedging transactions
relating to debt claims filed in the bankruptcy.
For shares, the Delaware Supreme Court recently recognized “[a] Delaware public pol-
icy of guarding against the decoupling of economic ownership from voting power.”12 There
is thus reason to believe that Delaware courts would at least seriously consider a remedy
against voting by over-hedged shareholders. Section 13(d)(1)(E) of the Exchange Act ar-
guably requires that owners of 5% or more of a corporation’s stock disclose hedging trans-
actions, but in practice market participants have not done so effectively. To address the
enforcement problem, commentators have advocated stricter disclosure obligations. For
example, Hu and Black (2006, 885) argue that voting by over-hedged shareholders or cred-
itors above a threshold of 0.5% of a company’s shares or debt should be reported.
Neither of these rules or proposals, however, deals with the exercise of control rights
other than formal voting rights. In particular, no rule forces an over-hedged creditor to
participate in a debt exchange, even if the over-hedging were publicly known. In freeze-out
tender offers, the Delaware Chancery Court has excluded votes by hedged shareholders for
taining favorable review of the consideration paid to the minority, see In re Cox Communications Inc. Share-
holders Litigation 879 A.2d 604 (2005); In re CNX Gas Corp. Shareholders Litigation, 4 A.3d 397 (Del. Ch.
2010).
11In re DBSD North America, Inc., 421 B.R. 133, 143 n. 44 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
12Crown Emak Partners, LLC v. Kurz, 992 A.2d 377, 387 n. 17 (Del. 2010).
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purposes of a majority-of-the-minority condition.13 These decisions are based on fiduciary
duties of the board and parent shareholders, however, and it is not clear that they would
extend to situations in which the hedged shareholder stands in opposition to the board and
the parent. In particular, the Court has affirmed that even controlling shareholders are under
no obligation to sell their shares, even if doing so might be beneficial to other shareholders
or the corporation.14
1.5 Conclusion
This paper has shown theoretically that derivatives can create opportunities for purely
value-reducing activity (over-heding and negative voting) if derivative traders can conceal
their overall positions from their counterparties. It has also argued that the institutional and
legal conditions in the US are such that the threat of such activity seems real at least in
out-of-bankruptcy restructurings and freezeout mergers.
This assessment of the role of derivatives is considerably less benign than that of other
papers that have assumed no assymetric information in the relationship between derivative
counterparties, in particular Bolton and Oehmke (2011) and Campello and Matta (2012).
Determining which assumption better describes the derivative market, or rather which parts
of that market correspond to which assumption, seems an important area for future research.
In as much as regulatory reforms push derivative trading into anonymous exchanges and
hence closer to the assumptions of the present paper, it would be worth considering flanking
measures to guard against the problems discussed here.
13See In re CNX Gas Corp. Shareholders Litigation, 4 A.3d 397, at 418 (Del. Ch. 2010); In re Pure
Resources, Inc., Shareholders Litigation, 808 A.2d 421, at 426 and 446 (Del. Ch. 2002).
14Cf. In re Digex, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, 789 A.2d 1176, 1189-91 (Del. Ch. 2002) (noting that a
controlling shareholder is free to block the sale of the controlled corporation to another bidder by not selling).
Chapter 2
American Exceptionalism Revisited:
The Global Cross-Section of Crime and
Punishment
2.1 Introduction
The United States exhibits astonishingly high crime and punishment among developed
countries. For example, in 2004, the WHO recorded 5.9 murders per 100,000 inhabitants
in the US, but only 0.8 in France (WHO 2009). Incarceration rates – measured as inmates
per 100,000 inhabitants – now range from the global maximum of 751 in the US to 91 in
France to 36 in Iceland (ICPS 2008). And the United States is one out of only two OECD
countries that continue to apply the death penalty (Anckar 2006). Moreover, as shown in
the little table below, Table 2.1, some of these differences appear to be long-lasting. For
example, while the US prison population per capita has increased almost five-fold since
1974, it was already seven times higher than France’s in 1974, a similar relative difference
as today. Even the dramatic drop in US crime during the 1990s by about 40% (Levitt 2004)
is small relative to these cross-country differences.
Understanding the drivers of these differences is immensely important. While the wel-
fare losses imposed by crime and punishment are hard to estimate, they are surely substan-
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Table 2.1:
US Canada UK France Germany Japan
homicides per 100,000, 2004a 5.9 1.4 2.0 0.8 0.7 0.5
prisoners per 100,000, 2004b 751 108 149 91 88 63
id., 1974-75c 162 109 66 24 57 34
death penalty, 2007d Yes No No No No Yes
asources: WHO 2009; b ICPS 2008; c 1st UN World Crime Survey, revised,
and WDI; dAmnesty International 2008
tial. For example, just the life expectancy reduction due to homicides is valued by Soares
(2004b) at 0.9% of US GDP, and 9.7% of Colombian GDP in 1995. In the United States,
the prison population now comprises 1% of the adult population, and combined with pro-
bation and parole, 3.2% of US adults are under some form of correctional control (PEW
Center for the States 2009).1 The out-of-pocket costs of US correction departments alone
are close to US$ 50bn, which impose a significant burden on state budgets (Steinhauer
2009).
In this paper, I assemble the literature’s largest data set of crime and punishment around
the world to inquire if commonly theorized country characteristics can explain the afore-
mentioned differences in crime and punishment, and in particular the US outlier position.
Briefly, the answer is that while US crime rates are not exceptional given US income in-
equality and family structure, US incarceration rates are an order of magnitude higher than
what any commonly mentioned measurable factors would predict. I find that of all the
major variables suggested in the cross-country literature on crime and punishment, only
lower levels of development, income inequality, and current teen birth rates are robustly as-
sociated with more crime, while only moderate levels of development, common law legal
systems, and (formerly) socialist systems are robustly associated with more prisoners; com-
mon law systems are also more likely to retain the death penalty. Muslim societies appear
to have less crime and harsher punishment. I find no cross-sectional support for links be-
tween democracy and crime (Lin 2007), or between children of teenagers and crime (Hunt
1For some reviews of the human tolls behind these numbers, see Clear (2008) and Murray and Farrington
(2008).
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2006). Outside the richest countries, I also find no support for criminological theories
linking incarceration rates to political structure and social policy.
My approach of exploiting the largest possible cross-country sample consciously de-
parts from most of the comparative criminological literature, which tends to study much
smaller groups of developed countries (e.g., Tonry and Farrington 2005 [7 countries];
Lappi-Seppälä 2008 [up to 25 countries]). Such studies are very valuable because they
can exploit a wealth of detailed data that is not available for larger samples, and because
they consider many subtle theories that, realistically, a cross-country regression cannot.
Yet they stand to benefit from being complemented with large-N cross-country studies for
several reasons, even if that means enlarging the sample to less developed countries. First,
the determinants of crime and punishment in less developed countries are of interest in
their own right. Second, many of the theories used to explain incarceration rates in small
developed world samples have no obvious limitation to developed countries, and some,
such as the "civilization" theory of punishment, would appear to be particularly apt at ex-
plaining differences between developed and developing countries. Third, and perhaps most
importantly, constant focus on the same few data points inevitably leads to "retrofitting"
of theories to the data, and calls for out-of-sample tests using additional countries. As a
robustness check, I also present results for only OECD and EU member states.
The primary data sets that I use are comparably high quality data on homicides in
2004 in 190 countries (WHO 2009), the number of prisoners around 2007 in 214 countries
(ICPS 2008), and the use of the death penalty in 2007 in 195 countries (Amnesty Inter-
national 2008). In addition, I pool data from multiple rounds of the International Crime
Victims Survey to obtain data on smaller crimes in 74 countries from 1989 to 2005, and
use some other data for robustness checks. I regress these measures of crime and pun-
ishment on all major explanatory variables that have been suggested in the comparative
literature. For the econometric reasons explained in section 2, I do not control for crime
in the punishment regressions and vice versa. This approach does not promise insight into
the crime-punishment nexus, but it does promise insight into the drivers of both. To deal
with the degrees-of-freedom problem of an overabundance of theories purporting to explain
comparative crime and punishment, I initially focus on small, related blocks of explanatory
variables at a time in the belief that any relationship of first-order importance should mani-
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fest itself in a simple setup controlling only for the level of development. In a second step,
I run against one another those variables that cleared the first hurdle (defined as a t-statistic
of at least 1.64).
While there is already a small regression literature on crime and punishment (see sec-
tions 3 and 4 below), this paper differs in at least one of the following four respects from that
prior work. First, most papers work with smaller samples. I am aware of only three papers
(Neapolitan 2001; Anckar 2006; Greenberg and West 2008)2 that exploit the full available
sample of punishment data (prisoners counts, and application of the death penalty), and
none that exploits the full sample of WHO and ICVS crime data. Second, many papers
control for a measure of punishment in crime regressions, and vice versa. As discussed in
more detail in Section 2, however, this approach yields estimates that are hard to interpret,
since they correspond neither to structural nor reduced form equations of crime and pun-
ishment conditional on a set of background variables. Third, and relatedly, this paper is the
only one to study crime and punishment in parallel. This is important for the interpretation
of coefficients. In particular, it might be tempting to interpret a positive correlation of some
background factor with higher incarceration rates as evidence that that background factor is
associated with higher "punitiveness." This interpretation is much less plausible, however,
if it turns out that the background factor is also associated with higher crime rates, such that
prisoner rates per crime may actually be lower. Fourth, only one other paper (Greenberg
and West 2008) studies the impact of legal origin on punishment policies. Finally, some
papers work with panel data. While this approach presents certain distinct advantages
over purely cross-sectional approaches, it also has some considerable disadvantages in the
comparative context, since many of the relevant explanatory variables such as democracy
or income inequality vary relatively little over time, and limited data availability for past
decades forces panel approaches to work with far fewer countries and lower quality data.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 explains in more detail the
rationale for focusing on reduced form equations in the comparative context. Section 3
introduces the dependent variables, and Section 4 the independent variables and the theories
behind them. Section 5 describes the specifications that I run. Section 6 presents and
2Ruddell (2005) uses the same incarceration data, but restricts the sample to the richest 100 countries.
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discusses the results. Section 7 reports robustness checks. Section 8 presents further results
for a surprisingly strong predictor of punishment, legal origins, and discusses the possible
theory behind it. Section 9 concludes.
2.2 Structural vs. reduced form equations
In this section, I set out in more detail the rationale for focusing on reduced-form equa-
tions of crime and punishment, respectively. The basic problem – simultaneity of crime and
punishment – is in principle well understood (e.g., Levitt and Miles 2007; Spelman 2008).
Yet the implications of the problem for cross-country regression specifications are often
not recognized. In particular, many researchers interested in the cross-country relationship
between punishment and some background social variable, such as inequality, include a
measure of crime as a control variable in an effort to "hold crime constant."3 This is par-
ticularly tempting in explorations of "punitiveness," i.e., punishment per crime, because
raw incarceration rates confound punitiveness and the mechanical effect of the crime rate
on incarceration, holding punishment constant.4 Given the simultaneity problem, however,
including a control for "crime" does not identify a structural equation, nor does it capture
the full effect of the background variable on punishment because some of that effect may
come through an effect on crime.
2.2.1 A simple model of the simultaneity problem
To make this clearer, to discuss what can or cannot be estimated, and to provide con-
ceptual clarity for the specifications actually estimated below, it is useful explicitly to set
out the stylized model that underlies all cross-country regressions in the area of crime and
3There are also studies of the cross-country determinants of crime that use measures of law enforcement
as right-hand side variables, but the authors are aware of the endogeneity problem and treat the estimates as
lower bounds and/or robustness checks (e.g., Soares 2004, 166n.6; Hunt 2006, 552).
4Listokin (2006) verifies the mechanical crime-prisoner relationship empirically using US data. The right
way to account for this effect, however, would be to modify the dependent variable by dividing it by the crime
rate, i.e., to use prisoners per crime rather than prisoners per population as the dependent variable (Blumstein
et al. 2005; cf. Pease 1994). On the econometric problems of this approach, see subsection 2.2 below.
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punishment. The model has a unitary concept of crime, C, and a unitary concept of punish-
ment, P , which at least implicitly is defined as punishment per crime.5 Individuals choose
their level of criminal activity given (expected) punishment P and background conditions
X:
C = f (P,X, ε) ,
where the error term ε includes factors omitted from X and P . P in turn is derived en-
dogenously from a policy-maker’s choice P ∗ plus error η. P ∗ trades off the costs of crime
and the costs of punishment, where X enters the analysis as an index of the objective func-
tion U (·) (as budget constraints, social preferences, etc.), while the error term η accounts
for implementation problems, delays, political frictions, etc.:
P = P ∗ + η = arg max
P ′
U (f (P ′, X, ε) , P ′;X) + η = g (X, ε, η) .
Two structural equations are commonly discussed in the literature: the crime equation,
f (·), and a measure of "punitiveness," which I understand to mean ∂P ∗
∂X
|C . In general,
however, simple cross-sectional regressions cannot yield unbiased estimates of either of
the two equations, given the correlation of P and C with X , ε, and η through the system of
equations C = f (P,X, ε) and P = g (X, ε, η).
2.2.2 The absence of valid instruments
To estimate the structural equations with instrumental variables, some elements of X
would need to be excludable from one of the two equations. As the theory review in Section
4 below will show, however, almost all variables of interest have potential direct effects on
both crime and the choice of punishment. In particular, all variables that have a plausible
effect on the choice of punishment given crime may also belong into the crime equation
5A full model would decompose P into the probabilities of prosecution and conviction, the length of the
prison term if convicted the severity of prison conditions, etc. It would also distinguish different categories
of crime and associated punishment, i.e., P and C would be vectors.
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directly.6
As a theoretical matter, some variables, such as the age structure of society, may be
excludable from the punishment equation. As a practical matter, however, a more subtle
problem relating to measurement error and the available data prevents estimation of the
punishment equation using these variables as instruments. The source of the problem is that
direct comparative measures of P , such as the sentence meted out for some particular crime,
are conceivable but do not currently exist for larger samples.7 In the absence of a direct
measure, one could think of using incarcerationrate
crimerate
= prisoners/population
crime/(population∗year)
ss
= E
[
prisontime
crime
]
as a measure of P . This would work well in the simple model above with unitary concepts
C and P , or with incarceration and crime rates by type of crime i, such that one could
construct Pi = incarcerationrateicrimeratei . Given data limitations, however, one would per force
divide the general incarceration rate, which is the only one available, by the crime rate for
a particular crime. This introduces noise because the relative frequency of types of crimes
is likely to differ by country. This noise will be correlated with variables that affect the
relative frequency of certain crimes. Hence these variables cannot be used as instruments
in practical empirical specifications of the punishment equation even though they may be
theoretically excludable from the structural equation. An example is the teen birth rate,
which is strongly positively correlated with the relative frequency of homicide.
2.2.3 Reduced-form equations
What can one estimate with simple cross-sectional OLS? First, one can estimate a
reduced form equation for crime, namely E∗ [C|X]. To be more precise, one estimates
E∗ [Ci|X] for particular crimes i for which we have reliable measurements (see section
3.1 below). Second, one can estimate a reduced form equation of the incarceration rate,
E∗
[
prisoners
population
|X
]
= E∗ [PC|X].8 This variable is also particularly well measured, and
6Soares (2004, 166n.6) also notes that it was not possible to find a good instrument for, in his case, the
number of policemen in the comparative context.
7Lin (2007) uses measures of average prison length per crime, and prisoners per crime, from the UN
Crime Trend Survey. These data, however, are only available for small groups of countries, and lacking
standardized definitions of crimes, are likely not very reliable.
8With different types of crime, P and C are vectors, with elements pi and ci, respectively, for crime i.
Chapter 2: American Exceptionalism Revisited: The Global Cross-Section of Crime and
Punishment 30
therefore deserves considerable attention. Finally, to the extent that the existence of the
death penalty is a valid measure of punitiveness, one can estimate a reduced form equation
of E∗ [P |X] using death penalty data. In this paper, I pursue all three options.
2.3 Dependent Variables
This section describes the data used as dependent variables in this paper.
2.3.1 Crime
Reliably measuring crime is notoriously difficult, since much crime is not reported.
Importantly, the propensity to report crime covaries with certain variables of interest, such
as the level of development or inequality, so that official crime data will paint a very mis-
leading comparative picture (Soares 2004; Gibson and Kim 2008). INTERPOL (1999)
explicitly warns against using its data for comparative purposes.
WHO homicide rate.
There are two series of crime data, however, that are considered reliable, and I use both
of them in this paper. The first is the homicide rate, because homicides are less easily
concealed. There are two comparative data series in wide use, UNODC data from police
statistics, and WHO data from death classifications by medical practitioners (Newman and
Howard 1999). I use the latter, as reported for 2004 (WHO 2009), because it has substan-
tially greater country coverage (N = 192). By comparison, the latest UNODC data (also
for 2004) is available for only 66 countries; the correlation between the two data series is
.72).
ICVS prevalence rates for common crimes.
The second reliable series of crime data come from victimization studies, i.e., repre-
sentative surveys eliciting experiences of victimization by various crimes (Tonry and Far-
rington 2005; Lynch 2006). Standardized comparative data on ten common property and
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contact crimes have been collected in five sweeps of the International Crime Victims Sur-
vey between 1989 and 2005, including the European Survey on Crime and Safety (van
Dijk, van Kesteren, and Smit 2007; van Kesteren 2007) (hereinafter collectively referred to
as ICVS).
The major shortcoming of these data is low coverage in any given sweep. Although 74
countries participated in at least one of the five sweeps, any given sweep covered far fewer.
For example, the 2004-05 sweep contained only 27 country surveys (essentially all and
only OECD countries). Consequently, papers using these measures in the past have had
only about 40 observations to work with (e.g., Soares 2004). To my knowledge, I am the
first to pool data from all five sweeps, including city surveys from developing countries,
which gives me 74 countries or around 300,000 individual responses (after eliminating
duplicates) to work with. (I take appropriate steps to adjust for the unbalanced nature of
the data, see Section 5.2 below.)
I use the one-year prevalence rate of victimization by any of nine common crimes (bur-
glary; attempted burglary; personal theft; theft of a car, theft from a car; theft of a bicycle;
theft of a motorcycle; assault; and robbery), i.e., the probability of being the victim of
any of these nine crimes at least once in the year before the survey.9 This measure is com-
monly emphasized in the comparative literature as a proxy for overall crime (e.g., van Dijk,
van Kesteren, and Smit 2007), it has sufficiently many non-zero observations to estimate
country averages reliably, and its focus on less serious crimes provides a useful counterper-
spective to the homicide measure.
WHO drug-related death rate.
For robustness checks, I also use the rate of drug-related deaths per 100,000 in 2004 as
reported by the WHO (2009). I do so because of the common perception that the US prison
population is in large part driven by the "war on drugs," and so I want to have at least some
idea of whether factors that correlate with higher prisoner counts also correlate with lower
or higher visible effects of drug abuse.
9I do not include sexual offenses against women in this count because this question was not asked in
all surveys, and in any event would presumably yield answers that are not necessarily comparable across
countries.
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2.3.2 Punishment
For punishment data, I focus on the incarceration rate and the application of the death
penalty, which are very reliably measured. Punishment has additional dimensions, most
importantly prison conditions. At least in the developed world, however, the severity of
prison conditions and the size of prison populations seem to be strongly positively corre-
lated (Whitman 2003; Tonry and Melewski 2008), and so I did not explore this point further
in the absence of good comparative data.10
Incarceration rate. The main punishment variable I use is the incarceration rate per
100,000 inhabitants (= PC) in 2007 or latest available from the International Center for
Prison Studies at King’s College, London (ICPS, 2008), who collect these data mainly
directly from national prison authorities. The incarceration rate is conceptually straightfor-
ward and easily observed. While incarceration rates alone do not capture all dimensions of
punishment associated with prisons (Young and Brown 1993), they are at least a joint mea-
sure of the most important ones, admission rates and sentence lengths. The ICPS data are
considered highly reliable (Neapolitan 2001; Lappi-Seppälä 2008), and country coverage
is near to universal.11 For a robustness check, I also use historic incarceration rates from
the United Nations World Crime Survey, rounds 1 through 8.12
Application of the death penalty. In addition, I use a dummy variable from Amnesty
International (2008) indicating whether a country still applied the death penalty in ordinary
10Neapolitan (2001,695) constructs a measure of prison conditions from the US State Department’s Coun-
try Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994-98, "group[ing them] into three general categories: prison
conditions meet minimum international standards, prison conditions are harsh and do not meet minimum
international standards, and prison conditions are harsh to the point of being life threatening." He finds that
harsh prison conditions correlate negatively with the level of development and freedom, and positively with
income inequality. The latter two effects go in the same direction as his findings for the incarceration rate.
11To match the data with other variables, I merge Guernesey and Jersey into Channel Islands, and England
and Wales, Northern Ireland, and Scotland into the UK.
12The name of the survey and the organizing entity has changed over the years. The original surveys were
administered under the auspices of the United Nations Criminal Justice and Crime Prevention Branch (for the
first and second survey, I use revised and expanded data, see http://www.uncjin.org/stats/wcsascii/readme.txt).
The latest rounds are administered by the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, and the survey is now
called the "United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems."
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criminal cases in 2007 at least in principle, even though it may not have carried out execu-
tions in 2007. These data are widely used in the literature (e.g., Anckar 2006; Greenberg
and West 2008). According to Amnesty International, there were 60 such countries in 2007,
out of 196 countries covered. If I used instead the number of executions, I would have only
24 non-zero observations (only 17 of which had more than one confirmed execution).
2.4 Independent variables
As independent variables, I attempt to use all of the main variables suggested in the
comparative literature on crime and punishment, in as far as they are amenable to testing
in the large cross-section and are not simultaneously determined with crime and punish-
ment.13 In particular, and subject to the previous caveat, I use all of the variables suggested
in the cross-country regression literature on crime (Messner, Raffalovich and Shrock 2002;
Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza 2002; Soares 2004; Hunt 2006; Lin 2007) and punish-
ment (Neapolitan 2001; Jacobs and Kleban 2003; Ruddell 2005; Anckar 2006; Downes
and Hansen 2006; Greenberg and West 2008), or close substitutes thereof. The theoretical
literature motivating these variables is voluminous; for excellent reviews, see Neapolitan
(1997), Whitman (2005), Tonry (2007), and Lappi-Seppälä (2008). Here I only give very
brief descriptions of each variable and its possible relevance. Summary statistics for all
variables are shown in Table 2.2.
13Independent variables that have been used in the comparative literature but are almost certainly simul-
taneously determined with crime and (official) punishment are extrajudicial killings (Neapolitan 2001), and
crime and official punishment themselves.
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Table 2.2: Main variables: summary statistics
Variable Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Homicides per 100,000 pop., 2004 191 10.78 12.23 0 82.63 (Colom-
bia)
1-year victimization rate, various years 165 .24 .10 .08 .60 (Uganda)
Drug-related deaths per 100,000 pop., 2004 191 1.22 2.41 0 21.60
(Afghanistan)
Inmates per 100,000 pop., 2007 214 164.15 130.46 22 751 (USA)
Death penalty, 2007 195 .31 .46 0 1
GDP per capita, 2007 (1,000 dollars) 188 7.47 11.17 0.09 68.05
Legal origin 213
English .35
German .03
Scandinavian .02
Socialist .17
Muslim population 1980, % 201 21.16 35.05 0 99.90
Protestant population 1980, % 199 15.18 23.60 0 99.80
Catholic population 1980, % 201 33.27 36.35 0 99.10
Ethnic Fractionalization 181 .43 .26 0.00 .93
Freedom, 2007 189 .63 .32 0 1
Federalism, 2004 222 .11 .31 0 1
Proportional voting, 2006 148 1.41 1.31 0 3
% foreign-born pop., 2005 206 10.42 15.83 0.03 79.98
% of pop. living in urban areas, 2005 208 56.20 24.23 9.5 100
Males 15-19 / total pop., 2004 217 .047 .011 .022 .070
Teen mother births / total births, 1984-88 115 .11 .06 0.01 0.27
Difficulty of firing workers, 2007 178 31.35 22.76 0 100
Gini 131 40.66 9.45 24.70 74.33
Unemployment rate, 2005/06 103 9.68 7.53 1.30 40.45
Hofstede 65
PDI 58.63 22.04 11 104
IDV 44.11 24.35 6 91
MAS 50.69 19.06 5 110
Schwartz 51
Hierarchy 2.26 .50 1.41 3.63
Continued on next page
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Table 2.2: Main variables: summary statistics
Variable Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Egalitarianism 4.81 .29 4.25 5.40
World Value Survey
Trust in people 83 .28 .15 .03 .67
Trust in police and parliament 79 .48 .11 .28 .87
Favor income inequality 71 5.89 1.15 3.54 8.24
Favor welfare state 80 5.77 1.07 3.26 7.86
Dislike competition 68 3.67 .57 2.47 4.80
Religious intensity 79 .73 .19 .15 .99
Since the sample overlap for different variables is imperfect, the actual samples in the regressions will differ from those shown
here. In addition, data used with the ICVS victimization data are year-matched to those data, and hence also different from
those shown here.
Some of the variables mentioned below could themselves be affected by crime and
punishment rates, particularly the level of development, unemployment, income inequality,
and social policy. I expect such effects to be small, but acknowledge that such concerns
could mar the interpretation of the results for those variables. At least for income inequality,
researchers have found that the link to crime is robust to methods controlling for potential
endogeneity (Fajnzylber et al. 2002).
Development. All of the aforementioned studies control for the level of development,
usually operationalized as GDP per capita.14 In fact, the impact of development is so
fundamental that presumably most other theories implicitly hold the level of development
constant, and I control for it in all of the regressions. The level of development affects the
opportunity set of potential criminals, and the institutional capacity of public law enforce-
ment. More subtly, the level of development may also affect social structures that infor-
mally suppress or encourage crime, and steer human behavior more generally. Finally, a
"civilization" effect may lead to less severe punishment in more developed societies. To
14Some authors, such as Neapolitan (2001), use instead the Human Development Index, which combines
GDP per capita, life expectancy, and educational achievement; I used it in some regressions with identical re-
sults. Other authors, such as Soares (2004), separately include the level of education. I found that coefficients
on a variable of primary school enrollment or adult literacy have the same sign as those for GDP per capita
(less crime, more punishment) without adding explanatory power or altering the results for other variables.
Since I do not see a theoretical reason for adding this separate variable, and to conserve degrees of freedom,
I do not report results with this variable.
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account for the possibility of the latter effect, I control for the level of development non-
linearly, using both the level of GDP per capita and its natural logarithm. With the ICVS
data, I use five-year PPP-adjusted averages around the survey date; with the other depen-
dent variables, I use 2007 raw data to maximize the sample size (using PPP-adjusted data
would lose as many as ten observations; the results are qualitatively identical). All the GDP
data come from the World Development Indicators.15
While researchers agree on the importance of development for some aspects of crime
and punishment, there is no agreement on the manifestation of this effect. In particular,
criminologists have often argued that development does not affect crime rates (e.g., Ruddell
2005:7), or even that development is criminogenic,16 and estimates by economists have
been unstable.17 Moreover, criminologists studying the relationship of development and
incarceration rates have reported mixed results.18 For both questions, the analysis of the
global cross-section thus promises to yield new insights.
Income inequality and social policy. Another major focus of the prior literature is in-
come inequality and the policies that influence it. The economic literature on crime mostly
emphasizes the effect of income inequality on the opportunity set of potential criminals
(e.g., Burdett et al. 2003). In the criminological and sociological literature on punishment,
income inequality is also viewed as a proxy for, and consequence of, social policies defin-
ing the relationship between the well-off and the less well-off, which are the major focus of
that literature. In that view, societies that support the poor with generous welfare spending,
and that support employees with protective labor regulation, are also likely to employ only
moderate punishment. I control for income inequality using the Gini coefficient from the
15To the raw GDP data, I also add data for Taiwan from the IMF Global Economic Outlook.
16Soares (2004) provides a full review of the relevant empirical literature.
17Soares (2004) and Hunt (2006) find no effect, while Lin (2007) find that the effect is negative for most
crimes but positive for others (rape and car theft).
18Neapolitan (2001) and Ruddell (2005), using the Human Development Index, find no significant asso-
ciation between development and incarceration rates, while Jacobs and Kleban (2003) and Lappi-Seppälä
(2008), using GDP per capita, do find one. I have also run many of the reported regressions with the Human
Development Index instead of GDP per capita, with similar results as those reported in this paper.
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World Development Indicators (closest year available),19 and for labor regulation using the
World Bank’s Doing Business index of the ease of hiring and firing a worker for 2007 (this
index is not available prior to 2003, and so cannot be used with the ICVS data). Given
the difficulty of measuring welfare expenditures, the high correlation of available measures
with the Gini coefficient, and the fact that some Gini data already includes the effect of re-
distributive policies (Deininger and Squire 1996), I do not control for welfare expenditure
in the reported regressions; unreported regressions using welfare data from Gwartney and
Lawson (2007) found similar results as for income inequality, which mostly disappeared
after controlling also for income inequality directly.
Political structure. In the aforementioned criminological literature, differences in social
policy are usually viewed in a broader context of different political systems, and classifi-
cations such as corporatism (Jacobs and Kleban 2003), social democracies vs. neoliberal
systems vs. conservative corporatist systems (e.g., Cavadino and Dignan 2006a/b), or con-
sensus vs. conflict political systems (Lappi-Seppälä 2008) are directly included in the
analysis. Since these classifications are only available for relatively small groups of coun-
tries, however, I instead use a year-matched measure of proportional voting, which is often
viewed as conducive to, or even a hallmark of, social democracies or consensus systems.20
Relatedly, Lin (2007) and others have suggested that democracies punish minor crimes
less harshly and hence have more of it, and inversely for major crime. To control for
democracies and liberty more broadly, I combine the Freedom House political rights and
civil liberties scores for the relevant year, and rescale them so that higher values correspond
to more freedom.21
Finally, Jacobs and Kleban (2003) have argued that federal systems should have more
prisoners because relevant political decisions will be less remote from the population and
19In robustness checks, I also use the 10/10 and 20/20 income ratios. The results are similar but weaker.
20I construct the measure from the World Bank’s Database of Political Institutions (revision 4) using the
formula of Pagano and Volpin (2005): PR - PLURALTY - HOUSESYS + 2.
21Lin (2007) uses the political rights score (and the civil liberties score as an instrument for it). Using
only the political rights score does not change my results. Nor does using the Polity IV score instead of the
Freedom House measures.
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hence more subject to populist pressures for harsh punishment. I control for federalism
using a dummy variable derived from the Handbook of Federal Countries (2005).
Population structure. The last major complex of variables considered in the literature is
the structure of the population. It is well known that young males are particularly prone to
criminal activity (Hirschi and Gottfredson 1983), and many cross-country studies attempt
to control for this. I do so using the share of 15-19 year old males in the population in
2004, as reported by the US Census International Data Base.22 Hunt (2006) has drawn
attention to the particular importance of young adults born to teen mothers. I control for
this using the share of children born to teen mothers out of all children born 15 to 19 years
prior to the relevant year (2004 for homicide and the current imprisonment data, and the
survey year for ICVS data), calculated from the United Nations Demographic Yearbook
Historic Supplement 1948-1997.23 As I discuss later in the paper, this variable may be
a proxy for broader social dysfunctions, since the current share of teen births (calculated
from the same sources) correlates even more strongly with crime rates, and conditioning
on the current rate removes any correlation of the present rate with crime.
Many papers also control for the level of urbanization since crime tends to be more
prevalent in cities (Glaeser and Sacerdote 1999). I do so using the percentage of the popu-
lation living in urban areas in the relevant year (from World Development Indicators).
Another important aspect of population structure considered in the literature is its ho-
mogeneity or heterogeneity (e.g., Ruddell 2005). Group differences might breed conflict
and hence crime, and a government dominated by one group might have less reservations
about punishing members of the other group. To control for this, I use the index of ethnic
fractionalization from Alesina et al. (2003),24 and the percentage of foreign born inhab-
22The data base does not provide historical data, so I do not use this control in the regressions with ICVS
data.
23Hunt (2006) focuses instead on the age group 20-29. As a theoretical matter, the group 15-24 seems to
be most relevant because criminal activity peaks during this interval. Using the share of young males, I found
that results using the 15-19 age group were generally qualitatively identical but stronger than those for older
groups. This is why I focus on that age bracket. In any event, as discussed in the next section, the results for
teen births are subject to considerable interpretative difficulties.
24In robustness checks, I also use an index of ethnic fractionalization from Fearon (2003), with identical
results.
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itants (from World Development Indicators). The index of ethnic fractionalization is the
closest one can get to accounting for racial divisions, which astute observers view as a
major factor of US crime and crime policy (Tonry and Melewski 2008).25
Legal system. The legal system is obviously of the utmost importance for crime and pun-
ishment, as it determines the government-administered part of the latter. Comparative data
on legal aspects of punishment are not available for large groups of countries.26 There is
evidence suggesting, however, that the historic origin of a legal system may play a role in
punishment. Greenberg and West (2008), using the classification of Mukherjee and Re-
ichel (1999), report that common law countries are significantly more likely than others
(except Islamic law countries) to retain the death penalty.27 This ties into an important
literature in economics which has documented pervasive correlations between "legal ori-
gins," i.e., common and civil law, and economic regulation and outcomes in areas ranging
from investor protection to conscription (La Porta et al. 2008). While this literature has not
specifically considered criminal law, it has found that common law countries tend to have
more severe criminal sanctions, at least "on the books," for breaches of securities (La Porta
et al. 2006) and corporate law (Djankov et al. 2008). Moreover, in a recent survey, La
Porta et al. (2008:286) characterize "legal origin as a style of social control of economic
life (and maybe other aspects of life as well)." Criminal law enforcement, however, is the
archetype of social control in modern societies. Hence legal origin deserves to be studied
in this context. (I consider the theoretical foundations in the discussion part of the paper.)
For continuity with the economics literature, I employ the legal origin classification
from La Porta et al. (1999), which classifies all legal systems as belonging to either the
common law group, the civil law group (consisting of the French, German, and Scandina-
25The US does indeed have one of the highest fractionalization scores among OECD countries, but Canada,
Belgium, Mexico, Switzerland, and Luxembourg have even higher scores.
26Lin (2007) considers the clearance rate from the UN World Crime Survey, but these data are suspect
since they derive from unreliable crime data (e.g., Gibson and Kim 2008).
27Ruddell (2005) finds that common and civil law systems have, on average, higher incarceration rates
than communist, mixed, and Islamic systems. His coefficient for common law systems is larger than for civil
law systems, but he does not report tests of statistical significance of this difference. Related to legal origin,
Jacobs and Kleban (2003) find higher incarceration rates in English-speaking countries, and Anckar (2006)
finds that use of the death penalty in former colonies differs by the last colonizing power.
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vian subgroups), or the socialist group. I updated these data for 13 countries and territories
not in the original dataset, using new editions of the sources used in La Porta et al. (1999)
(CIA 2008; Reynolds and Flores 2008) and classifying as socialist legal origin successor
states of countries classified as socialist in La Porta et al. (1999) (this was relevant for the
former Yugoslavia). Unlike La Porta et al. (2008), I maintain socialist legal origin as a
separate category to capture the special position of the transition economies with respect
to crime and crime policy (cf. Neapolitan 2001; Lappi-Seppälä 2008); however, the paper
later also reports results for English vs. other legal origin.
Culture and religion. Some contributions place great emphasis on cultural factors. For
example, Lappi-Seppälä (2008) argues that higher levels of trust are associated with less
harsh punishment practices. Unfortunately, good measures of culture are notoriously diffi-
cult to obtain, and those that exist are available only for medium sample sizes. Moreover,
some measures, such as the World Value Survey measures of trust in other people and
the government used by Lappi-Seppälä (2008), are likely to be simultaneously determined
with crime and punishment, as more crime presumably reduces trust in other people and
the government. I therefore only briefly and separately consider the correlations of culture
using Hofstede’s power distance, individualism, and masculinity indices;28 Schwartz’s hi-
erarchy and egalitarianism indices (Licht et al. 2007); mean World Value Survey responses
of trust in people (question A165) and trust in police and parliament (questions E074 and
E075);29 and mean World Value Survey responses of attitudes to income inequality, the
welfare state, and competition (questions E035, E037, and E039).
A related variable that is available for large samples, and that has been used extensively
in the death penalty literature, is religion. Whitman (2005:27-8) notes that studies of the
role of religion in punishment "cry out to be done." Anckar (2006) and Greenberg and
West (2008) find that higher percentages of Buddhist and perhaps Muslim inhabitants are
28Downloaded from www.geert-hofstede.com.
29I use answers from the 1999-2004 sweep, or, if missing the 1994-1999 sweep. The first variable is
identical, and the second similar, to the main variables in Lappi-Seppälä (2008). The second differs because
for large samples, the only available public trust variables in the World Value Survey are trust in (1) parliament
and (2) police, while corresponding values for the government and the justice system are only available for 48
and 44 observations, respectively. These data have been introduced into economics by La Porta et al. (1997).
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associated with a higher likelihood of retaining the death penalty, while Catholics may
be associated with a lower likelihood. Given the low number of countries with sizeable
groups of Buddhists, I am skeptical about the possibility of disentangling their influence
on the death penalty in a cross-country regression. I focus on the main world religions,
employing measures of the percentage of the population identified as Muslim, Catholic,
or Protestant, respectively, in 1980 from La Porta et al. (1999). I also employ a World
Value Survey measure of the intensity of religion, but given the small sample for which it
is available, do so only summarily in conjunction with the culture variables.30
Other independent variables. Many other variables have been discussed in the theo-
retical literature. Only two of them, however, have found application in many empirical
studies, namely the unemployment rate, and the economic growth rate. I do not use the lat-
ter because of its frequent fluctuations, which make it seem unlikely that differential growth
rates could explain much of the huge cross-country differences in crime and punishment. I
do use total unemployment rates from the ILO (average of 2005 and 2006 values), but in
light of three caveats limit its use to one regression per table. The first caveat is that the
rates available for larger samples are not standardized. The second caveat is that even the
non-standardized rates are available for 104 countries, or a little more than half the sample.
The final caveat is that from the perspective of some criminological theories that argue for
its importance, the unemployment rate is endogenous, because those theories argue that
criminal punishment is used to control excess labour.
2.5 Regression specifications
2.5.1 General issues
In what follows, I estimate for each of the six main independent variables – WHO
homicide rates for 2004, ICVS overall prevalence rates for 1989-2005, ICPS incarceration
30The particular variable from the World Value Survey used in the reported regressions – self-identification
as a religious person – has been suggested by McCleary and Barro (2006) as one that is not subject to
theological differences across religions. The robustness checks also consider all other measures suggested
from McCleary and Barro (2006).
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rates for 2007, the application of the death penalty in 2007 – a parallel set of cross-sectional
regressions (Tables 2.3–2.6). In the first five regressions, I include blocks of related vari-
ables one at a time, controlling only for the level of development. In the sixth regression,
I include only those variables that were "significant" in the first five regressions (t ≥ 1.64)
(in this regard, I treat the two legal origin dummies as inseparable and the three religious
group variables as inseparable because omitting one of them would change the reference
category for the other). In the seventh regression, I control for the unemployment rate and
those variables significant in the sixth regression. I also present a separate set of regressions
with culture variables in Table 2.7.
The first block of variables is GDP per capita, and the natural logarithm thereof to ac-
count for possible nonlinearities. (Since I have fewer observations in the ICVS regressions,
and there is no evidence of nonlinearities for crime, I omit the level control there; unre-
ported results with this control were materially the same.) The second block consists of
those variables that are most historically persistent and possibly a determinant of some of
the later variables: legal origin, religious composition, and ethnic fractionalization. The
third block comprises political structure variables: freedom, federalism (not available for
the historical ICVS data), and proportional voting. The fourth block describes the popu-
lation structure: foreign-born, urban, males 15-19 (not available for ICVS data), and teen
birth rates (lagged 15-19 years). The fifth block addresses social policy: the ease of firing
workers (not available for ICVS data), and income inequality.
I do not hold the sample constant across these regressions since doing so would dramat-
ically reduce the sample size because of imperfect sample overlap for different variables.
For example, a constant sample across regressions one through five would have only 69
observations. For some coefficients or standard errors that change materially in moving
from one regression to another, I note in the discussion whether this is due to the different
sample or the different controls.
All regressions are estimated using simple OLS, except the death penalty regressions,
which are estimated with logit and report marginal effects and associated standard errors.
All reported standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust, except in Tables 2.7–2.9, because
I find that in these smaller samples the finite sample correction of the normal standard errors
is more important than the heteroskedasticity-correction in avoiding understated standard
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errors.
To reduce the weight of outliers, and because the dependent variables cannot be neg-
ative, all dependent variables are log-transformed (results with levels are essentially the
same, however), except for the death penalty dummy and the ICVS victimization rate
(which is lies between .08 and .60, so that the transformation would have little effect).
2.5.2 ICVS data
More complicated operations are only required for the ICVS data, which in their raw
form consist of around 300,000 survey respondents collected between 1989 and 2005 in
single or multiple sweeps per country. I match data for control variables to the year of the
survey.
Since I am interested in the effect of country-level variables, I show below results using
country-level averages rather than individual data, as suggested by Wooldridge (2003). To
address the concern that working with country averages introduces aggregation bias (Lynch
2006), I also estimated all the regressions shown here with a 2-stage procedure suggested by
Borjas and Sueyoshi (1994), where the first stage logit estimates country-level fixed effects
with individual gender, town-size, and age covariates, and the second stage estimates the
effect of country-level covariates on the estimated country-level fixed effects using OLS or
GLS.31 Moreover, I estimated some models directly with the individual data. In either case,
the results were similar to those reported here.
To account for over-sampling within countries for any given sweep, I apply the fur-
nished survey weights to all the individual data. In addition, to account for over-sampling
of countries, I weight all data from one country by the inverse of the frequency with which
that country has been sampled over the five sweeps 1989-2005.32 To account for the poten-
tially large differences between crime experiences in large cities and countries as a whole, I
include a dummy for those national surveys that were conducted only in the country’s main
31I used a simple OLS in the second stage because the estimated coefficient variances from the first stage
were negligible compared to the residual variance of the second stage.
32Some countries participated in only one sweep, others in five, and the oversampled countries tend to be
exactly those that have already been heavily analyzed in the criminological literature, so overweighting those
countries would run counter to my goal of broadening the scope of analysis.
Chapter 2: American Exceptionalism Revisited: The Global Cross-Section of Crime and
Punishment 44
city. I also include sweep dummies to account non-linearly for possible worldwide trends
in crime and punishment. I cluster the standard errors at the country level to account for
within-country correlations.
2.6 Basic results and discussion
Tables 2.3 through 2.6 present the basic results, and Table 2.7 presents additional results
for culture variables. Here I summarize the basic pattern that emerges from the tables.
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Table 2.3: Homicide rates
Dependent variable: ln(homicides per 100,000)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
GDP per capita, thousands -0.030*** -0.044*** -0.035*** -0.0022 -0.017
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.010)
ln(GDP per capita) -0.72*** -0.48*** -0.78*** -0.87** -0.68*** -0.77*** -1.01***
(0.16) (0.17) (0.19) (0.42) (0.17) (0.25) (0.25)
English legal origin -0.050 0.0092
(0.15) (0.21)
Socialist legal origin -0.49** 0.37
(0.20) (0.25)
Muslim pop. -0.79*** -0.100 -0.65
(0.25) (0.46) (0.52)
Catholic pop. 0.27 -0.27 -0.39
(0.28) (0.31) (0.31)
Protestant pop. 0.12 0.72* 0.66*
(0.45) (0.39) (0.38)
Ethnic frac. 1.33*** 0.93** 0.90*
(0.34) (0.40) (0.46)
Freedom 0.28
(0.38)
Federal state 0.33
(0.26)
Proportional voting 0.045
(0.072)
Immigrants, % 0.00063
(0.0071)
% urban 0.0092
(0.0065)
Males 15-19 / total pop. 17.3
(18.8)
Teen/total births 1984-88 9.53*** 5.31** 3.76
(1.75) (2.19) (2.33)
Difficulty firing worker -0.0061
(0.0041)
Gini 0.052*** 0.070*** 0.061***
(0.0094) (0.014) (0.015)
Unemployment rate 0.0095
(0.031)
Constant 4.38*** 3.28*** 4.38*** 2.35 2.35*** 0.79 2.30*
(0.45) (0.60) (0.53) (1.84) (0.71) (1.25) (1.22)
R2 0.37 0.52 0.40 0.56 0.60 0.76 0.73
Observations 178 169 145 91 128 71 60
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
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Table 2.4: Victimization rates from common crime
Dependent variable: ICVS one-year victimization rate, country average
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ln(GDP per capita) -0.030*** -0.031*** -0.042** -0.034 -0.022* -0.030** -0.037**
(0.011) (0.012) (0.017) (0.024) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015)
English legal origin 0.017
(0.023)
Socialist legal origin -0.017
(0.024)
Muslim pop. -0.073 -0.066 -0.050
(0.057) (0.055) (0.038)
Catholic pop. 0.035 0.025 0.022
(0.033) (0.033) (0.034)
Protestant pop. 0.065** 0.057* 0.049
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
Ethnic frac. 0.048
(0.048)
Freedom 0.073
(0.086)
Proportional voting 0.0099
(0.0083)
Immigrants, % -0.00045
(0.0012)
% urban 0.0017
(0.0010)
Teen/total births, t-15/19 0.21
(0.19)
Gini 0.0030*** 0.0022** 0.0022**
(0.00087) (0.00086) (0.00086)
Unemployment rate 0.0011
(0.0015)
Constant 0.50*** 0.48*** 0.54*** 0.43** 0.31** 0.41*** 0.46***
(0.098) (0.12) (0.12) (0.20) (0.12) (0.12) (0.14)
Survey type and sweep
dummies
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.34 0.46 0.36 0.49 0.42 0.47 0.49
Clusters 73 71 66 47 71 70 59
Observations 163 156 149 108 161 159 138
Country-averages are calculated with ICVS survey weights
Country observations are weighted by the inverse of the number of sweeps the country participated in
OLS regressions, country-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
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Table 2.5: Incarceration rates
Dependent variable: ln(prisoners per 100,000)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
GDP per capita, thousands -0.034*** -0.025** -0.030** -0.028* -0.044*** -0.026* -0.0098
(0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.016) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015)
ln(GDP per capita) 0.87*** 0.78*** 0.80*** 0.51 0.89*** 0.53** 0.20
(0.16) (0.16) (0.18) (0.33) (0.15) (0.26) (0.28)
English legal origin 0.34*** 0.33** 0.36**
(0.12) (0.15) (0.17)
Socialist legal origin 0.60*** 0.54*** 0.41**
(0.19) (0.20) (0.19)
Muslim pop. -0.28
(0.21)
Catholic pop. 0.024
(0.21)
Protestant pop. -0.35
(0.28)
Ethnic frac. 0.16
(0.22)
Freedom -0.037
(0.28)
Federal state -0.16
(0.18)
Proportional voting -0.061
(0.046)
Immigrants, % 0.015** 0.013**
(0.0063) (0.0063)
% urban 0.00018
(0.0034)
Males 15-19 / total pop. 6.43
(9.24)
Teen / total births 1984-88 3.29*** 3.15*** 3.66**
(1.11) (1.14) (1.61)
Difficulty firing worker -0.0065*** 0.00034
(0.0023) (0.0031)
Gini 0.0039
(0.0059)
Unemployment rate -0.0033
(0.020)
Constant 2.09*** 2.12*** 2.44*** 2.65** 2.16*** 2.65*** 3.88***
(0.47) (0.54) (0.50) (1.28) (0.49) (0.88) (0.92)
R2 0.26 0.35 0.21 0.27 0.31 0.38 0.28
Observations 183 168 145 95 128 88 74
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
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Table 2.6: Application of the death penalty
Dependent variable: Death penalty applied
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
GDP per capita, thousands 0.0029 0.00065 0.0065 0.0046 0.0017
(0.0049) (0.0053) (0.0042) (0.0091) (0.0073)
ln(GDP per capita) -0.059 0.021 -0.031 0.056 -0.14
(0.080) (0.10) (0.091) (0.19) (0.094)
English legal origin (d) 0.23** 0.18 0.056
(0.098) (0.12) (0.078)
Socialist legal origin (d) -0.22*** -0.21*** -0.077
(0.074) (0.059) (0.057)
Muslim pop. 0.075 -0.15 -0.10
(0.14) (0.15) (0.11)
Catholic pop. -0.35** -0.26* -0.22*
(0.17) (0.16) (0.12)
Protestant pop. -0.52** -0.67** -0.14
(0.23) (0.27) (0.15)
Ethnic frac. -0.023
(0.16)
Freedom -0.32** -0.31 -0.15
(0.16) (0.19) (0.22)
Federal state (d) 0.079
(0.096)
Proportional voting -0.11*** -0.061* -0.076***
(0.035) (0.034) (0.028)
Immigrants, % 0.013*** 0.0038
(0.0049) (0.0035)
% urban -0.0083*** -0.0016
(0.0029) (0.0020)
Males 15-19 / total pop. 7.25
(7.74)
Teen / total births 1984-88 1.61
(0.99)
Difficulty firing worker -0.0021
(0.0019)
Gini -0.0017
(0.0042)
Unemployment rate -0.0035
(0.0062)
Pseudo R2 0.00 0.16 0.15 0.22 0.03 0.26 0.45
Pr(y|x) 0.30 0.27 0.24 0.20 0.24 0.20 0.067
Observations 181 170 146 91 128 146 85
Logit estimtes; marginal effects with robust standard errors in parentheses
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
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Table 2.7: Culture variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
homicides homicides homicides prisoners prisoners prisoners
GDP per capita, thousands -0.033 -0.012 -0.022 -0.015* -0.019* -0.0036
(0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.0088) (0.011) (0.010)
ln(GDP per capita) -0.35 -1.11** -0.59 0.50* 0.72** -0.012
(0.49) (0.52) (0.50) (0.26) (0.32) (0.27)
Hofstede: power dist. 0.00035 0.0041
(0.0088) (0.0051)
Hofstede: individualism -0.013 -0.00042
(0.0078) (0.0043)
Hofstede: masculinity -0.00043 -0.0019
(0.0071) (0.0041)
Schwartz: hierarchy -0.52 0.12
(0.42) (0.30)
Schwartz: egalitarianism -1.24** -0.67
(0.60) (0.43)
Trust in people -2.41* -0.68
(1.28) (0.86)
Trust in police and parlia-
ment
0.052 -1.23
(1.29) (0.84)
Favor income inequality 0.15 0.16*
(0.13) (0.083)
Favor welfare state -0.076 -0.060
(0.14) (0.091)
Dislike competition 0.18 0.20
(0.23) (0.15)
Self-identify as religious 0.0036 -0.0011
(0.0079) (0.0053)
Constant 3.66* 12.7*** 3.12 3.11*** 5.30* 4.58***
(1.91) (4.05) (2.77) (1.03) (2.72) (1.70)
Joint p-value for culture
vars.
.40 .12 .20 .82 .14 .09
R2 0.43 0.53 0.55 0.07 0.13 0.22
Observations 63 49 56 65 51 58
OLS standard errors in parentheses
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
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2.6.1 Variables associated with differences in crime and punishment
Only one or perhaps two sets of variables appear to be consistently related to both crime
and punishment: the level of development, and possibly the religious composition of the
population.
Richer countries experience less crime, yet they incarcerate more people per crime
and have a higher incarceration rate. Statistically, these estimates are significant at the
1% level in most specifications. Economically, the estimated coefficients are large: the
estimated elasticity of homicides with respect to GDP is about 1. To be sure, the estimates
for common crimes are smaller, but even there the estimated elasticity of prison time with
respect to GDP is positive and in some specifications exceeds one as well. As hypothesized
by the "civilization" theory and as documented in smaller samples (Lappi-Seppälä 2008),
the relationship between the level of development and incarceration rates is non-linear,
turning negative at higher levels of GDP.33
According to the point estimates, going from a fully Protestant to a fully Muslim pop-
ulation is associated with more than a 50% decline in homicides, and a one-standard de-
viation decline in the probability of being victimized by smaller crimes, while raising the
expected prison time per crime by a factor of two or more and increasing the probability
of retaining the death penalty by over 50%. This finding is interesting because outside the
death penalty literature, the link between crime, punishment, and religion seems to have
received little attention. This being said, some of the coefficients are unstable, and the dif-
ference between coefficients is not always statistically significant (for example, the p-value
for the difference between the Muslim and Protestant coefficients in model 6 of Table 2.3
is .17). Even if they are statistically significant, the coefficients obviously need to be in-
terpreted with caution. In particular, one cannot conclude that Muslim societies have less
crime because they punish more harshly. For example, the regression might be picking
up differences in lifestyle between Muslim and Protestant societies, where members of the
latter engage in more behavior that puts them in risk of being victimized, such as going out
33According to the estimated coefficients, the relationship turns negative only at very high levels of GDP
per capita, namely approximately that of the Netherlands (US$ 25,600 per capita in 2007 in 2000 US$). This
is an artefact of the specification, however; the relationship is already negative if one restricts the sample to
countries with a 2007 GDP per capita above US$ 10,000 (in 2000 US$).
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at night.
2.6.2 Variables associated with differences in crime
The results confirm previous findings (Fajnzylber et al. 2002; Messner et al. 2002;
Soares 2004) that income inequality is very strongly associated with higher crime rates.
According to the point estimates, a one standard deviation increase in income inequality
corresponds to 75% more homicides and at least a two standard deviations higher proba-
bility of victimization by smaller crimes. These estimates are statistically significant at the
1% level. By contrast, income inequality is not correlated with higher punishment, at least
not higher punishment per crime.
As in Hunt (2006), the share of children born to teenage mothers 15-19 years earlier
is associated with higher crime, although only the estimate for homicides is statistically
significant, and only in larger samples. Depending on the specification (and sample), a
one standard deviation increase in the teen birth share is associated with between 27% and
85% higher homicide rates in Table 2.3.34 The teen birth rate is also associated with higher
incarceration rates. The latter effect seems to be due to the mechanical effect of the crime
rate on incarceration rates.
Hunt (2006) interprets the correlation between the teen birth rate and crime as evidence
that more difficult childhoods predispose young adults to being victims or perpetrators of
crime. It is also possible, however, that teen birth rates proxy for other social difficulties.
To disentangle these two stories, I add the share of children born to teenage mothers in
2004 to models 4 and 6 of tables 2.3 and 2.5 (unreported). When I do so, all of the effect
is absorbed by the current teen birth share. This suggests that the teen birth share 15 to 19
years prior is a proxy for current social conditions, and the mechanism of this effect will
require further research. (Also see Section 7.1 below for similar results in EU and OECD
countries only.)
34In model 7, the estimated coefficient would be a little larger and the standard error a little smaller if the
unemployment rate were not included yet the sample held constant.
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2.6.3 Variables associated with differences in punishment
As Greenberg and West (2008), I find that common law countries are 30% more likely
to retain the death penalty than civil law countries, an estimate significant at the 5% level.
In addition, I find that common law countries also have about 40% more prisoners per
capita than civil law countries, or 50% more per homicide when combining the estimates
of tables 2.3 and 2.5, estimates that are significant at the 5% level. Section 8 below is
dedicated to interpreting this novel finding.
(Formerly) Socialist countries have even higher incarceration rates both absolutely and
per homicide. The point estimates in tables 2.3 and 2.5 suggest the punishment per crime
is about twice as high as in civil law countries. Moreover, they are less likely than civil law
and common law countries to retain the death penalty, and this is true even if EU member
states are excluded from the sample (not reported).
Higher immigration rates also appear to be associated with harsher punishment across
as measured by both the incarceration rate and the death penalty, but the estimates for each
dependent variable are fragile and depend on the specification.
2.6.4 Variables not robustly associated with either crime or punish-
ment
It is also very informative to note which variables do not contribute to explaining the
global cross-section of crime and punishment. To be sure, the lack of an economically
sizeable and/or statistically significant coefficient in these regressions could be the result
of a poorly measured variable, or inappropriate controls. Yet in samples of around 180
countries, one might expect even a poorly measured variable to exhibit a visible correlation
with the outcome of interest if the variable is truly important.
Particularly noteworthy is the lack of any significant correlation between variables of
political structure (freedom, federalism, proportional voting) or policy (ease of firing work-
ers) with any of the outcomes (except the death penalty). These mechanisms are the focus
of attention of much of the criminological and sociological literature, yet they do not ap-
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pear to have much explanatory power in larger samples (on developed countries only, see
Section 7.1 below). Nor do the cross-sectional results confirm the fixed-effect panel finding
of Lin (2007) that democracy is associated with more petty crime but less serious crime.
One possible explanation for this is that more stable polities with less crime sort into be-
coming democracies, while less stable polities shun democracy, so that the cross-sectional
results would obscure a causal link between democracy and crime. It is also possible,
however, that the within-country changes driving Lin’s (2007) results are correlated with
temporary transitional turmoil that is not adequately captured by the transition dummies
that Lin (2007) employs.
It is also noteworthy that urbanization and the age structure do not explain any or much
of the cross-country differences in crime (or punishment). These factors are very important
for the within-country geographic and demographic distribution of crime, but apparently
not for the cross-country variation. One reason could be low cross-country variation in
these variables conditional on the level of development. In this connection it is worth
adding that my ICVS results were hardly affected by controls for the type of survey (nation
or city) and the size of the respondent’s home town. Aggregation bias in working with
country averages (Lynch 2006) may be less of a problem in practice than in theory.
Unemployment is not significantly correlated with any of the variables of interest ei-
ther. This might be due to the low quality of the unemployment data, or to the fact that
unemployment correlates only weakly with property crime and not at all with violent crime
according to domestic studies (Levitt 2004).
As expected, ethnic fractionalization is associated with higher homicide rates – ac-
cording to the point estimate, moving from zero to full ethnic fractionalization more than
doubles the homicide rate. Ethnic fractionalization is not associated with any of the other
dependent variables, however, in particular not with the severity of punishment, as some
sociological theories would have suggested. This is also important because ethnic frac-
tionalization could have been a reasonably exogenous foundation for interpersonal trust,
which is emphasized by authors such as Lappi-Seppälä as a key determinant of less severe
punishment practices. As shown in model 3 of table 2.7, interpersonal trust is correlated
with lower incarceration rates, but the much stronger negative correlation with homicide
rates (model 6) suggests that causation might run from lower crime to lower incarceration
Chapter 2: American Exceptionalism Revisited: The Global Cross-Section of Crime and
Punishment 54
rates and higher trust, rather than between trust and incarceration rates directly. To a lesser
extent, this is also a concern for Schwartz’s measure of egalitarianism, which is correlated
with less homicides and to a lesser extent with less imprisonment.
The other culture measures considered in table 2.9 are not significantly correlated with
crime and punishment at all. To be sure, the World Value Survey measures are jointly
significant, but the individual coefficients are not and, moreover, have contradictory signs:
one would expect aversion to competition and sympathy for income inequality to have
opposite signs, but in fact they have the same, positive sign.
2.7 Robustness
I performed a number of additional analyses to check the robustness of the results just
reported. As already mentioned, I used a number of alternative measures for some of the
independent variables (above Section 4), and I ran the ICVS regressions with a two-stage
procedure and the individual micro-data. Here I report additional results using a smaller,
conceptually different sample (only OECD and EU member states); using prison data from
past decades (the 1970s) and showing in parallel results with contemporary data for that
sample; and using drug-related deaths as the dependent variable.
In Section 8 below, I report results from even more different samples and conditioning
sets for legal origin because the finding for this variable was the most novel and surprising
of those shown above. In any event, the scheme for choosing specifications and samples
above already embeds some robustness checks because the sample and the conditioning
set change between various regressions of one table, and there are at least two dependent
variables for each concept of interest (crime and punishment). Moreover, the log transfor-
mation of all of the dependent variables (except the ICVS victimization rate, and the death
penalty dummy) reduces the weight of outliers.
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2.7.1 Developed countries only (EU & OECD)
Table 2.8 shows results for only the EU and OECD member states using the incarcer-
ation and homicide rates as dependent variable, and only those independent variables that
were individually significant in the full sample regressions (models 6 of tables 2.3 and 2.5;
to conserve space, I do not report religion variables because they are jointly insignificant
in this setup). I use only the natural logarithm of GDP per capita because within this rich
country sample I expect, and find, only a negative correlation between the level of devel-
opment and incarceration rates.
The results are qualitatively similar to the full sample results. Coefficients are even
larger for most variables (except socialist legal origin). Since the smaller sample also cre-
ates larger standard errors, however, the teen birth share coefficient is not statistically sig-
nificant. If I replace the historic teen birth rate (1984-88) by the current teen birth rate
(2004), however, the coefficient doubles (prisoners) or triples (homicides) in size, and is
statistically significant at the 1% level (not reported). This is further evidence that some-
thing about current social conditions, rather than the childhood environment of what are
now young adults, is associated with increased crime (and punishment).
In addition, I also add proportional voting, the ease of firing workers, and income in-
equality back into the regression for the incarceration rates to see if these key variables
of the sociological and criminological literature perform better in this sample, under the
impression of which the theories were originally developed. In the case of proportional
voting, I also control for legal origin to see if proportional voting is only a proxy for civil
law origin. It is not. In this small sample, proportional voting and less income inequality,
but not protective labor law, are indeed correlated with lower incarceration rates. Whether
this is because these countries have higher quality data, because the theories make differ-
ential predictions for developed and developing countries, or because the correlation of the
variables in the smaller sample is spurious, is a different question.
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Table 2.8: Restricted sample: OECD and EU only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
homicides homicides homicides prisoners prisoners prisoners prisoners
ln(GDP per capita) -1.05*** -0.94* -1.06*** -0.39 -0.39 -0.61* -0.44*
(0.29) (0.47) (0.27) (0.32) (0.31) (0.34) (0.22)
English legal origin 0.53** 0.33
(0.21) (0.22)
Socialist legal origin 0.42 0.46*
(0.27) (0.26)
Ethnic frac. 1.88***
(0.55)
Proportional voting -0.17**
(0.081)
Immigrants, % 0.028**
(0.012)
Teen/total births 1984-88 4.19 3.84
(3.69) (2.44)
Difficulty firing worker -0.0052
(0.0045)
Gini 0.059*** 0.043**
(0.020) (0.016)
Constant 4.37*** 4.13* 3.04** 6.19*** 6.60*** 6.78*** 5.43***
(1.26) (2.19) (1.43) (1.40) (1.35) (1.51) (1.17)
R2 0.47 0.32 0.50 0.32 0.40 0.35 0.34
Observations 37 36 35 38 38 36 34
Dependent variables: ln(homicides per 100,000) ("homicides") and ln(prisoners per 100,000) ("prisoners")
OLS standard errors in parentheses
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
2.7.2 Prison populations in the 1970s
Table 2.9 shows results for the incarceration rate (natural logarithm) using UN data
from the 1970s, side-by-side with results for 2007 ICPS data holding the sample constant.
The 1970s prison data are sparse, and to obtain a reasonable sample size, I average all
available data over ten years. To match the prison data, I also average the freedom, immi-
gration, and urbanization data over this period. The proportional voting data only go back
to 1975 anyway; to get a slightly bigger sample, I use 1980 data for this variable. Given
my finding above that the current teen birth rate, rather than the historical rate, are relevant,
I employ here the average teen birth rate over the period 1974-78. I use the same legal ori-
gin, religion, and ethnic fractionalization data as above. Data on income inequality, labor
regulation, and federalism are not available for the 1970s.
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Table 2.9: Robustness in time: Prisoners per capita 1970s vs. 2000s
Dependent variable: ln(prisoners per capita)
Models 1-4: 1970s Models 5-8: 2000s
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
GDP per capita, 1000s -0.044 -0.046 -0.11** -0.039 -0.044*** -0.037** -0.037** -0.010
(0.029) (0.033) (0.041) (0.037) (0.014) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014)
ln(GDP per capita) 0.45* 0.50 0.78** 0.41 1.01*** 0.95*** 1.24*** 0.50
(0.26) (0.30) (0.29) (0.38) (0.29) (0.30) (0.36) (0.35)
English legal origin 0.48* 0.33*
(0.25) (0.17)
Socialist legal origin 0.96 0.50
(0.82) (0.55)
Muslim pop. 0.024 -0.21
(0.49) (0.32)
Catholic pop. 0.30 0.25
(0.40) (0.26)
Protestant pop. 0.77 -0.020
(0.52) (0.36)
Ethnic frac. 0.53 0.52
(0.57) (0.39)
Freedom 1.02 -0.88
(0.63) (0.54)
Proportional voting -0.27*** -0.16**
(0.079) (0.07)
Immigrants, % 0.022* 0.013**
(0.012) (0.006)
% urban -0.006 -0.001
(0.007) (0.004)
Teen/total births 7.45*** 7.19***
(1.85) (1.51)
Constant 0.52 -0.46 -2.07 0.23 1.50 1.29 1.45 2.46**
(2.02) (2.41) (2.25) (2.91) (0.94) (1.04) (1.09) (1.19)
R2 0.06 0.22 0.39 0.38 0.20 0.35 0.39 0.46
Observations 51 50 38 43 51 50 38 41
Models 1-4 (5-8) use data from the 1970s (2000s); the sample is held constant in corresponding models
OLS standard errors in parentheses
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
The results using 1970s data are reassuringly similar to those using data from the first
decade of the 21st century. The nonlinear correlation with the level of development is
less pronounced in the 1970s, while the correlation with legal origins, proportional voting,
and the immigrant share of the population is even stronger. The point estimates for ethnic
fractionalization and the teen birth rate are almost identical in both time periods. The
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(insignificant) estimates for freedom and religious composition vary between the two
periods, but only the difference in the freedom coefficient is statistically significant (p =
.002).
2.7.3 Drug-related deaths
Table 2.10 shows results using drug-related deaths in 2004 (from WHO 2009) as the
dependent variable. I show these results because the war on drugs is perceived by many as a
key driver of US incarceration rates, and I want to know if characteristics that correlate with
higher harsher punishment but not lower crime according to the main estimates above –
mainly common law and socialist legal origin, and the share of immigrants – correlate with
larger or smaller visible drug problems. If anything, characteristics positively correlated
with higher punishment are also correlated with more drug-related deaths. This is true for
socialist legal origin, the share of Muslims, the share of immigrants, and even the level of
development. As the latter result indicates, however, these estimates need to be interpreted
with caution. Drug-related deaths may be higher in developed countries simply because
other causes of death have been curtailed more successfully, raising life expectancy and
hence prolonging the opportunity to kill oneself with drugs.
An interesting feature of these results is that the cross-country predictors of drug-related
deaths bear little similarity to the cross-country predictors of other crime. In particular,
income inequality and the teen birth rate are correlated with less drug-related deaths. It is
also interesting that drug issues seem to be more pressing in less free countries.
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Table 2.10: Drug-related deaths
Dependent variable: ln(drug-related deaths)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
GDP per capita, thousands -0.025 -0.011 -0.026 -0.023 -0.042
(0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.029) (0.027)
ln(GDP per capita) 0.70*** 0.79*** 1.30*** 0.055 0.93*** 0.70* 0.58 0.68**
(0.26) (0.27) (0.32) (0.58) (0.32) (0.40) (0.55) (0.28)
English legal origin -0.031
(0.28)
Socialist legal origin 0.77*
(0.39)
Muslim pop. 1.32** 0.94
(0.61) (0.64)
Catholic pop. 0.43 0.63
(0.61) (0.59)
Protestant pop. 0.070 0.23
(0.77) (0.78)
Ethnic frac. 0.40
(0.45)
Freedom -2.18*** -1.72** -1.86 -1.47***
(0.59) (0.75) (1.13) (0.51)
Federal state 0.56* 0.50
(0.31) (0.34)
Proportional voting 0.040
(0.096)
Immigrants, % 0.044** 0.035* 0.046* -0.0049
(0.022) (0.020) (0.027) (0.014)
% urban -0.0057
(0.0079)
Males 15-19 / total pop. -8.56
(23.2)
Teen/total births 1984-88 -3.41
(3.59)
Difficulty firing worker 0.0066
(0.0059)
Gini -0.028** -0.014
(0.013) (0.013)
Unemployment rate 0.051**
(0.023)
ln(alcohol-related deaths) 0.17*
(0.100)
Constant -2.98*** -4.14*** -3.69*** 0.21 -2.66** -2.12 -2.15 -2.08***
(0.78) (1.12) (0.91) (2.45) (1.20) (1.34) (1.48) (0.72)
R2 0.04 0.16 0.18 0.09 0.10 0.20 0.14 0.11
Observations 169 160 138 82 125 125 82 165
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
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2.8 Discussion: Legal Origins
Most of the results above fit into existing theories, even though some of the results were
surprising given the prior state of the literature. The result for common law legal origin,
however, is novel and puzzling (socialist legal origin is largely congruent with transition
economies, whose particularly large prison populations have been identified before, for
example by Lappi-Seppälä 2008).
I start with further robustness checks. Table 2.11 presents tests-of-means of the natural
logarithm of incarceration rates for various subsamples and various legal family groups:
common law, socialist, civil law, and the three civil law subgroups French, German, and
Scandinavian civil law. I show results for the full sample (N = 213)35 with and without the
USA, for OECD countries and non-OECD countries, for all countries and territories with
at least 100,000 inhabitants, and for all independent countries. In all samples, common law
countries have on average at least 40% more prisoners than civil law countries, and this
difference is statistically significant at the 1% level (5% in the OECD split samples). This
is also true for each subgroup of the civil law. The finding of higher incarceration rates in
common law countries is thus very robust.
To be sure, even correlations that appear robust in one sample can be spurious, and
with a finite population of countries, there is in this case no possibility to check with more
data. The question is whether there is some theory that could explain why common law
countries tend to incarcerate more people, or are more likely to retain the death penalty.
This is by no means obvious.36 While some comparative legal scholars have identified
differences in the history of criminal punishment in England and the US on the one hand
and France and Germany on the other and drawn a connection to contemporary differences
(Whitman 2003), they have not based their account on differences of common and civil
law, and others have in fact argued that contemporary differences in the sentencing process
in criminal procedure are at odds with certain traditional views of common and civil law
procedure (Frase 2008).
35I lose one observation, Palau, because this country could not be assigned a legal origin with the primary
materials referenced in La Porta et al. (1999).
36For a general review of the legal origins theory from a lawyer’s perspective, see Roe (2006).
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Table 2.11: Natural logarithm of (inmates per 100,000 population), by legal origin
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
full sample \USA OECD \OECD pop.≥ 105 independent
Observations 213 212 30 183 186 186
Means by subsample and legal origin
(number of observations)
English 4.947 4.924 5.131 4.931 4.893 4.832
( 74) ( 73) ( 6) ( 68) ( 58) ( 61)
non-English 4.721 4.721 4.640 4.738 4.727 4.679
(139) (139) ( 24) (115) (128) (125)
Socialist 5.124 5.124 5.221 5.113 5.147 5.147
( 37) ( 37) ( 4) ( 33) ( 36) ( 36)
Civil Law 4.574 4.574 4.524 4.587 4.563 4.489
(102) (102) ( 20) ( 82) ( 92) ( 89)
French 4.610 4.610 4.759 4.592 4.586 4.518
( 90) ( 90) ( 10) ( 80) ( 81) ( 77)
German 4.423 4.423 4.442 4.376 4.605 4.423
( 7) ( 7) ( 5) ( 2) ( 6) ( 7)
Scandinavian 4.136 4.136 4.136 NA 4.136 4.136
( 5) ( 5) ( 5) ( 0) ( 5) ( 5)
Tests of means (t-statistics)
English vs. non-English 2.01** 1.82* 2.05* 1.55 1.39 1.27
English vs. Socialist -1.08 -1.24 -0.21 -1.03 -1.54 -1.84*
English vs. Civil Law 3.14*** 2.96*** 2.64** 2.56** 2.66*** 2.72***
English vs. French 2.71*** 2.54** 1.36 2.52** 2.35** 2.37**
English vs. German 1.53 1.48 1.87* 0.85 0.82 1.17
English vs. Scandinavian 2.03** 2.01** 2.61** NA 1.97* 1.71*
Socialist vs. Civil Law 4.22*** 4.22*** 3.48*** 3.50*** 4.52*** 5.17***
Socialist vs. French 3.82*** 3.82*** 2.67** 3.48*** 4.16*** 4.76***
Socialist vs. German 2.64** 2.64** 4.71*** 1.41 1.99* 2.74***
Socialist vs. Scandinavian 3.34*** 3.34*** 5.31*** NA 3.44*** 3.44***
French vs. German 0.68 0.68 2.14* 0.40 -0.07 0.37
French vs. Scandinavian 1.49 1.49 3.78*** NA 1.45 1.28
German vs. Scandinavian 0.93 0.93 1.79 NA 1.98* 0.93
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 (two-sided)
In Table 2.12, I present some regressions with the log incarceration rate as dependent
variable, controls for level and log GDP per capita, legal origin, and certain other variables
that may proxy for a pertinent effect of common law systems. To isolate the relationship
between the additional variables and legal origin, I present in each case in the column
immediately to the right another regression with the same sample but without the additional
variables. In unreported regressions, I did the same with the death penalty as the dependent
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variable, with similar results.
Table 2.12: The meaning of legal origins: other variables
Dependent variable: ln(inmates per 100,000)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
GDP per capita, 1000s -0.023 -0.024* -0.026** -0.026** -0.022* -0.022* -0.026** -0.038***
(0.015) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011)
ln(GDP per capita) 0.76*** 0.77*** 0.81*** 0.80*** 0.69*** 0.67*** 0.78*** 0.87***
(0.19) (0.18) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.15) (0.15)
English legal origin 0.30** 0.30** 0.32*** 0.32*** 0.32** 0.37*** 0.23* 0.32**
(0.14) (0.14) (0.10) (0.10) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13)
Socialist legal origin 0.50*** 0.57*** 0.58*** 0.58*** 0.67*** 0.66*** 0.67*** 0.47***
(0.18) (0.17) (0.13) (0.13) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.13)
Case law -0.093
(0.072)
Juries 0.21
(0.15)
Judicial Independence -0.089
(0.12)
Freedom -0.047
(0.17)
Proportional voting -0.045
(0.045)
Difficulty firing worker -0.0043*
(0.0023)
Gini 0.019***
(0.0070)
Constant 2.24*** 2.12*** 2.05*** 2.06*** 2.47*** 2.46*** 1.50*** 1.95***
(0.55) (0.53) (0.46) (0.46) (0.48) (0.48) (0.49) (0.45)
R2 0.35 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.32 0.32 0.41 0.35
Observations 117 117 177 177 145 145 128 128
Each pair of regressions, starting from the left, is estimated with a constant sample.
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
In principle, common law refers to a legal system that developed in England over the
centuries in relative isolation from legal developments on the European Continent, and was
later transplanted more or less comprehensively to the former English colonies (Zweigert
and Kötz 1998). The most distinct features of the common law systems compared to the
European, civil law systems are believed to be the existence of the jury, case law, and
generally a more independent judiciary. As shown in model 1, however, dummies for the
existence of these institutions (from Klerman et al. 2011) are not significantly correlated
with incarceration rates and do not affect the common law coefficient at all. (An unreported
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F -test shows that these three variables are not jointly significant either.)
Hayek (1960; 1973) famously drew a connection between institutions of the common
law and liberty. Controlling for freedom, however, does not affect the common law coeffi-
cient either (models 3 and 4).
Common law is highly negatively correlated with proportional voting (ρ = −.39 in
the full sample, and ρ = −.56 in the OECD). Yet proportional voting does not absorb the
common law coefficient either (models 5 and 6).
More generally, La Porta et al. (2008) review the relationship of legal origin to other
commonly used cross-country variables and conclude that legal origin is not a proxy for
any of them. Instead, they (286) "adopt a broad conception of legal origin as a style of
social control of economic life (and maybe of other aspects of life as well)." They go on to
"argue that common law stands for the strategy of social control that seeks to support pri-
vate market outcomes, whereas civil law seeks to replace such outcomes with state-desired
allocations." This view appears to be detached from the legal system properly speaking,
and resembles broader theories developed by political scientists and sociologists compar-
ing Anglo-Saxon and continental developed economies, who in various forms emphasize
the latter’s more egalitarian distribution of resources (e.g., Esping-Andersen 1990; Hall and
Soskice 2001; Soskice and Iversen 2008).37 It would also provide a link to the criminologi-
cal and sociological literature mentioned above which argues that incarceration policies are
closely related to social policies more generally, and that inclusive political systems with
less inequality tend to incarcerate less people.
I test this theory in model 7 by adding restrictions on firing, and income inequality to
the regression.38 These variables do depress the common law coefficient by about one third.
At the same time, they leave the other two thirds of the coefficient unexplained.
37As Rostowski and Stacescu (2006) and others point out, legal origins are almost perfectly correlated with
other legacies that may have been bequeathed by the colonizing powers to their former colonies.
38In unreported regressions, I also added variables of stock market outcomes, which are a primary focus
of the legal origins literature, to see if they correlate with higher incarceration rates, but did not find evidence
for this. The common law coefficient was unaffected by these additions.
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2.9 Conclusion
In this paper, I have analyzed the determinants of crime and punishment in the global
cross-section, focusing on the reduced form equations of crime and punishment as func-
tions of plausibly exogenous background variables. I use relatively reliable data on homi-
cides, victimization by common crimes, incarceration rates, and application of the death
penalty, for much larger cross-sectional samples than have previously been analyzed in the
literature.
I find that lower levels of development, income inequality, current teen birth rates, and
possibly protestant societies are robustly correlated with more crime, while higher levels
of development, common law and socialist legal origin, Muslim societies, and possibly the
current teen birth rate and the number of immigrants are robustly correlated with higher
levels of punishment. The relationship between development and incarceration rates is
non-linear, turning negative at higher levels of GDP per capita.
Equally importantly, I find no cross-sectional support for other theories, particularly
prominent criminological theories relating incarceration rates to political structure and so-
cial policy (except in the OECD and EU member states), the positive link between democ-
racy and crime reported in Lin (2007), and the theory that lagged teen birth rates drive
today’s criminal activity (Hunt 2006).
One way to gauge what we learn from these regressions is to return to the actual homi-
cide and incarceration rates in the six developed countries shown at the beginning of this
paper, and compare them to the out-of-sample predictions of the main regression models
of this paper (i.e., estimated without these six countries).
As shown in the little table, Table 2.13, above, the predictions are astonishingly accu-
rate, with one glaring exception, namely the US incarceration rate. The predicted number
of prisoners per 100,000 in the United States (109) is almost an order of magnitude lower
than the actual number (751). Thus explaining the systematic part of the cross-country
variation in crime and punishment, including the relatively high US homicide rate, puts the
US outlier position with respect to punishment (Whitman 2003; Liptak 2008; Tonry and
Melewski 2008) into even sharper relief. The exceptional nature of US punishment is an
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Table 2.13:
US Canada UK France Germany Japan
homicides per 100,000, actuala 5.9 1.4 2.0 0.8 0.7 0.5
homicides per 100,000, predictedb 4.7 2.3 1.7 0.8 1.1 0.4
prisoners per 100,000, actualc 751 108 149 91 88 63
prisoners per 100,000, predictedd 109 144 126 99 105 51
Sources: a WHO 2009; b model 6 of Table 2.3; c ICPS 2008; d model 6 of Table 2.5
The models used for prediction were estimated without the six countries shown here.
important area for further research, and should be borne in mind by economists studying
the relationship of crime and punishment with US data.
Chapter 3
Legal Origin or Colonial History?
3.1 Introduction
Over the last decade, an important literature in economics has documented pervasive
correlations between economic outcomes, legal rules, and legal origin. In this literature,
legal origin means whether a country’s legal system is based on British common law, or
French, German, or Scandinavian civil law (Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes,
and Andrei Shleifer 2008). In most of the literature, these correlations have been inter-
preted as evidence that some structural difference between common and civil law has im-
portant implications for economic outcomes (e.g., Edward Glaeser and Andrei Shleifer
2002; Thorsten Beck, Asl? Demirgüç-Kunt, and Ross Levine 2003).
In this paper, we explore another interpretation of these correlations. The reason almost
all legal systems of the world belong to either the common or the civil law family is that the
European powers imposed their legal system on their colonies. Consequently, "legal origin"
is almost perfectly congruent with "colonial history" understood as the identity of the dom-
inant colonizing power. Nevertheless, the legal regime was just one of many differences
between the various colonial powers. Colonizing powers differed in their policies relating
to education, public health, infrastructure, European immigration, and local governance. In
addition, colonizing powers did not choose their colonies randomly, so colonies may differ
in characteristics such as climate and natural resources. Disentangling these factors is not
merely of historic interest. To the extent that policy lessons can be learned from the legal
origin literature, they depend critically on identifying the causes of the observed effects.
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Table 3.1 provides a simple illustration of our main point. The legal origins literature
focuses on the fact that French colonies inherited French civil law, while British colonies
inherited English common law. As table 3.1 shows, however, French and British colonies
also differed on many other dimensions. French (ex-)colonies had significantly lower edu-
cation and life expectancy than British (ex-)colonies in 1960, even though per capita GDP
was similar. In addition, the French and the British tended to colonize different types of
places, judging by the significantly higher initial European mortality in French colonies.1
The second-to-last column of table 3.1 also shows that colonies which received French civil
law not directly from the French but from another colonizing power, such as Spain or the
Netherlands, were doing as well as British (ex-)colonies in 1960. In sum, this simple table
suggests that the identity of the colonizing power mattered for reasons other than whether
that power brought British common law or Continental civil law. The rest of this paper
pursues this point in more detail.
The focus on colonies is an important aspect of our analysis. Only former colonies
received their legal system exogenously (from their colonizer).2 By contrast, in the origin
countries, such as England, France, and Germany, the legal system developed endoge-
nously. Hence in the origin countries, legal "origin" was itself influenced by each country’s
economic and political structure, and correlations between economic outcomes and legal
system may reflect unobserved country characteristics or a causal effect from economic
structure to legal system, rather than the other way around. Countries which voluntarily
adopted foreign legal systems - such as Japan, Thailand, and Turkey - present similar is-
sues.
We employ two strategies, which we further elaborate in section 2, to differentiate legal
from other colonial channels. First, we exploit the fact that the correlation between colo-
nial history and legal origin is not perfect. "French" civil law was imposed not only by the
1This may be related to the timing and geographic center of the respective colonial empires, most French
colonies being situated in Africa.
2To be sure, all colonies officially or unofficially retained substantial parts of their native legal system that
competed and interacted with the European overlay. For the purposes of this paper, all that matters is whether
the foreign part that they did receive had a noticeable impact on development. Hence we will not mention
this caveat in the remainder of this paper.
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Table 3.1: Colonial Inputs and Outcomes
s.d. Colonizer
French British Other
French
Civil Law
Country
Other
Log 1960
GDP Per
Capita
0.94 7.56 7.85 7.89 8.10
Primary
Schooling
1960
0.32 0.51 0.74** 0.77*** 0.96**
Life
Expectancy in
1960
12.43 45.84 53.55* 52.60** 60.30**
Log Settler
Mortality
1.25 5.82 4.16*** 4.44***
Asterisks indicate results of t-tests against the null hypothesis that
the group mean is the same as the mean for former French colonies;
*** p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.
Data sources: colonizer: authors’ coding; GDP: Heston et al.
(2009); primary schooling (gross primary enrollment ratio) and life
expectancy (at birth): Barro & Lee (1994); settler mortality:
Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson (2001).
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French but also by the Belgians, Dutch, Portuguese, Spanish, and others. Moreover, some
former English colonies, such as South Africa and Sri Lanka, maintained legal elements
from a previous colonizer and are therefore more properly considered "mixed" legal sys-
tems. To capture these fine points, we develop a new coding of legal and colonial history.
Second, we employ proxies for the manner in which the colonial power treated the colony.
Our main non-legal proxies measure educational investment and life expectancy in 1960.
Our preferred interpretation of these variables is as a measure of the colonizing powers’
investment in human capital, but our main argument would be unaffected if these variables
were instead proxies for other favorable policies or even, in the case of life expectancy, ge-
ographic factors (in which case correlations with colonial history would reflect selection).
We compare the explanatory power of these proxies to that of variables, such as judicial
independence or the use of juries, which reflect differences between the common and civil
law. For these legal proxies, we expand existing data sets to increase country coverage
considerably.
In section 3, we begin our empirical exploration with economic growth as the dependent
variable. We focus on growth in per-capita GDP after 1960, the period when data becomes
available for a large sample of countries. One of us (Paul Mahoney 2001) has shown that
common law countries grew faster during this period than civil law countries. In general,
the legal origins literature has documented many correlations between common law and
institutions generally considered conducive to economic growth, such as property rights,
financial markets, labor markets, and less bureaucratic and less corrupt government. We
find, however, that only former French colonies, rather than French civil law countries as
a whole, grew more slowly than common law countries between 1960 and 2007, and that
mixed jurisdictions grew faster than all other groups. Moreover, all of these differences
are entirely accounted for by proxies for non-legal colonial policy – education and life
expectancy in 1960. Legal system proxies, such as the recognition of case law and judicial
independence, appear to have no influence on growth at all.
In section 4, we look at other dependent variables that according to the legal origins
literature (e.g., La Porta et al. 2008) are strongly influenced by legal origins: the ratio
of equity market capitalization to GDP, the ratio of private credit to GDP, unemployment,
corruption, and the duration of court proceedings. The results are mixed and, mostly, not
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statistically significant. In section 5, we discuss the discrepancies between the growth and
other results, as well as the general interpretation of our findings. We conclude in section
6.
While the results of this paper undermine some of the earlier, more simplistic expla-
nations for the correlation between economic performance and legal origin, they are not
incompatible with more recent interpretations. In their 2008 survey, La Porta et al. (2008,
286) "adopt a broad conception of legal origin as a style of social control of economic life."
Under this view, legal origin is not just whether a country has a legal system based on the
Code Napoléon or on the precedents of the English common law. Nor is legal origin simply
about whether the judiciary is a bureaucracy tasked with textual interpretation rather than
a high-status independent group with de facto law making powers. Rather, legal origin
stands for "strategies of social control" that either "support private market outcomes" or
implement specific state policies (id.). Mahoney (2001, 505) also connects legal origin to
"different views about the relative role of the private sector and the state." This broad con-
ception of legal origin might be better measured by the identity of the dominant colonial
power than by comparative lawyers’ classification of legal systems. Strategies of social
control might be more influenced by educational systems and governmental structure than
by whether code or precedent was the dominant source of law, or whether judges or juries
were the principle fact finders.
The paper most similar to ours in the existing literature is Jacek Rostowski and Bog-
dan Stacescu (2006). They investigate the impact of legal and colonial history on post-
colonial economic growth (1960-1995) by inserting dummy pairs for ex-British and ex-
French colonies and British and French legal systems, respectively, into standard growth
regressions. Like us, they find that (French vs. British) colonial history seems more impor-
tant than (French vs. British) legal origin. Our analysis is broader and deeper, however, in
that we also investigate other dependent variables. In addition, we attempt to unpack legal
origin and colonial history by looking at the institutions that they may have influenced.
Moreover, we develop what we feel is a superior classification of legal origin and colonial
history (cf. section 2.1 below),3 and analyze the data without imposing a linear structure
3Rostowski & Stacescu classify four former English colonies as having French civil law—Malta, Mauri-
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on the interaction of legal origin and colonial history.
Our emphasis on colonial history has some affinity to Daron Acemoglu, Simon John-
son, and James Robinson (2001). Acemoglu et al. argue that colonists were more inclined
to build good institutions when the colony was hospitable to European settlements, and in-
vestigate the lasting effect of such institutions on long-term economic growth using settler
mortality in earliest colonial times as an instrument. Acemoglu et al.’s argument focuses
on the conditions in the colonies rather than on the identity of the colonizer. As they point
out (id., 1388), their argument may nevertheless explain some of the correlations between
colonizers and outcomes because some European powers, particularly the English, colo-
nized more favorable places than others.4 We are sympathetic to this view, and some of our
estimated differences between colonizers may be the result of such selection. At the same
time, we believe it is not the whole story. Indeed, our proxies for colonial policy remain
jointly significant when we control for settler mortality in our growth regressions (unre-
ported). We do not pursue this question further because settler mortality data is available
for only about half of our sample.
In this paper, we remain within the cross-country regression framework of the legal
origins literature.5 Cross-country regressions have well-known limitations, among them an
excess of potentially relevant independent variables (Ross Levine and David Renelt 1992).6
tius, Seychelles, and Swaziland. With the exception of Swaziland, all of these are more properly classified as
mixed legal systems. They were under British control for more than a century, during which time England im-
posed much of its own law, especially in commercial matters. Similarly, Rostowski & Stacescu classify seven
common law countries as not former British colonies – the United States, Canada, New Zealand, Australia,
Israel, Ireland, and the United Kingdom. With the exception of the United Kingdom and possibly Israel, all
of these were former colonies, although Rostowski and Stacescu do not count them as such, because they
were independent before the mid-twentieth century. Because of these questionable classifications, we believe
our paper provides a more persuasive foundation for the relative importance of legal and colonial origin.
4The correlation of British colonies with raw and log-transformed settler mortality is -0.01 and -0.30,
respectively. It is striking to note that 12 of the 13 countries with the lowest settler mortality rates are former
British colonies, and only one of the 30 countries with the lowest settler mortality rates is a former French
colony. For criticism of the settler mortality data, see, Albouy (forthcoming).
5The cross-sectional nature of our data and tests also prevents us from testing dynamic theories such as
Spamann’s (2009) diffusion theory.
6La Porta et al. (2008) address some of the most relevant competing variables, notably religion, culture,
and politics. The economic growth literature has sought to overcome the problem with techniques such as
Bayesian averaging, but the results are not always straightforward to interpret. For example, Sala-i-Martin et
al. (2004) find a relatively low probabilities that Spanish (Pr=0.12) and British (Pr=0.03) colonies grew more
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Our findings reinforce these concerns in that we put forward yet another independent vari-
able that was not considered in previous papers. We also cannot address the concern of
Raghuram Rajan and Luigi Zingales (2003) and Mark Roe and Jordan Siegel (2009, 792-
94) that the legal origins results may be an artifact of data for the 1980s and 1990s, except
that we note that our results for growth also hold, albeit in an attenuated manner, if we
restrict the sample to the years 1960-1980 (unreported); data for the other dependent vari-
ables are not available for that time period.
3.2 Empirical Strategy - Independent Variables
The close historical link between colonial and legal origin makes it challenging to dis-
tinguish empirically between the two. Doing so is important, however, if we are to focus on
the features most important to institutional and economic development. It is also essential
for the development of sound policy recommendations. We pursue two strategies for dis-
tinguishing legal origin and colonial history. First, we exploit the fact that the correlation
between colonizer and legal origin is not perfect. Second, we employ proxies for colonial
policy and compare their explanatory power to that of proxies for key features of the legal
system. As we discuss below, neither strategy is perfect but, taken together, they allow us
to obtain a rough estimate of the relative importance of legal origin and colonial history.
3.2.1 Countries for which legal origin and colonial history do not co-
incide
As explained above, former colonies generally received their legal system from the
country which colonized them, meaning that colonial and legal origin overlap. In particu-
lar, no former British colony now has a civil law system7 and no French (or other continen-
slowly or faster, respectively, than other colonies after de-colonization (they do not control for legal origin).
But they also find a very high probability that GDP, schooling, and life expectancy around 1960 had sizeable
effects on growth, and as we show below, these seem to have differed systematically by the identity of the
colonizer.
7Swaziland is an exception. It was colonized first by the Dutch and then by the British, but British
colonization seems to have no lasting impact on the law. There are no data on GDP growth 1960-2007 for
Swaziland so this exception is relevant only to some of the non-growth regressions.
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tal European) colony now has a common law system. There are, however, two groups of
countries for which legal origin and colonial history do not coincide perfectly: (1) Coun-
tries with French civil law which were not colonized by France, and (2) Former British
colonies with legal systems which contain elements of both common and civil law. We
can exploit these two groups to investigate whether legal origin or colonial history is more
relevant for post-colonial development
Our coding of legal origin relies on a review of all the standard sources.8 The main
difference between our and La Porta et al.’s (2008) legal origin coding is the classification
of some jurisdictions as "mixed," which we exploit for the test discussed in subsection 2
below. That subsection also discusses mixed jurisdictions in greater detail. Our coding also
differs for five other countries, although those differences are only relevant to the regres-
sions using dependent variables other than GDP growth 1960-2007, because that dependent
variable was not available for these five countries.9 The results of all our tests, except those
relying on comparisons between mixed and common law countries, are unaffected if we
use the coding of La Porta et al. (2008).
Our colonial history variable encodes the dominant colonial power, if any, in the period
1750-2007, based primarily on Encyclopedia Britannica Online.10 Where the country was
colonized by multiple countries, we generally coded the most recent colonial power, on
the theory that this country was the one which was likely to have had the biggest effect
8In addition to Flores & Reynolds, Foreign Law, and the CIA World Factbook, which seem to have been
LLSV’s main sources, we examined: Roberts-Wray (1966), Zweigert & Kötz (1998), Campbell (2006), Inter-
national Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, Law & Judicial Systems of Nations, Modern Legal Systems Cy-
clopedia, and University of Ottowa, World Legal Systems Website, http://www.droitcivil.uottawa.ca/world-
legal-systems/eng-monde.html.
9Although La Porta et al. (2008) classify Yemen as French civil law, we coded it as Islamic Law because
of the dominant influence of sharia law, even in commercial matters. For similar reasons, we would have
differed from La Porta et al. (2008) and coded Afghanistan, the Maldives, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and
the United Arab Emirates as Islamic Law as well. These countries, however, were not included in any of our
regressions because they lack GDP growth data 1960-2007 and we do not classify them as former colonies
(so they were excluded from the non-growth regressions). We also change the coding of Swaziland from
common law to French civil law (see footnote 11 above). Brunei, East Timor, and Kiribati were not coded by
La Porta et al. (2008); we code them as common law, French civil law, and common law respectively.
10Occasionally, where Encyclopedia Britannica Online did not provide the relevant information, we also
consulted other sources, such as the CIA Factbook and Wikipedia. Countries formed by joining colonies of
multiple powers, such as Cameroon, were coded according to the colonial power of the more populous part.
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on education, health, and infrastructure at the time of independence. However, when the
more recent colonial power controlled the country for a relatively brief period, we coded
the prior colonial power as the dominant one.11
To test the impact of colonial history without losing precious degrees of freedom, we
group countries into five groups: former English colonies, former French colonies, former
colonies of French civil law countries other than France (Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands,
Portugal, Spain, Ottoman Empire,12 and pre-communist Russia), other former colonies,
and countries never colonized.13
Table 3.2 below shows the legal origin/colonial history combination for all countries
in our growth sample. We now describe the two most important groups of countries for
which the two origins do not overlap, followed by a brief discussion of why other groups
are unsuitable for comparison.
Imposition of French civil law by different colonial powers
French civil law, as this concept is understood in the legal origins literature, was im-
posed not only by the French, but also by the Belgians, the Dutch, the Ottomans, the Por-
tuguese, and the Spanish, who all followed a variant of French civil law at home. Further-
more, as discussed above, these colonial powers pursued rather different colonial strate-
gies. Hence if colonial history mattered, we should expect to see systematic differences
between these groups. By contrast, if the legal system were the dominant channel through
11For this reason, League of Nations Mandates in the Middle East – Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, and
Syria – were coded as former Ottoman colonies rather than former French or English colonies. This coding
is most debatable for Israel, where Ottoman influence largely disappeared with the influx of Jewish settlers.
Nevertheless, in order to be consistent about the coding of Israel and Jordan, which had very similar colonial
histories, we coded Israel as a former Ottoman colony. We did check, however, that none of our results
are dependent on that coding. For reasons similar to the Mandate countries, Egypt was coded as a former
Ottoman colony (rather than a British colony). The Philippines was also a close call. It had been a Spanish
colony for over 300 years when it was ceded to the U.S. in 1899, which governed the Islands until 1946. We
code the U.S. as the dominant colonial power, but one could argue that the years as a Spanish colony were
more important. Recoding the Philippines as a Spanish colony does not substantially change our results.
12We classify the Ottoman Empire as governed by French civil law, because the Ottoman Commercial
Code of 1850 and other mid-nineteenth century Ottoman codes were based primarily on French codifications
(Zweigert & Kötz 1998, 109ff.).
13For some robustness checks, we also used a sixth group: countries that were part of the Austro-Hungarian
Empire.
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which colonial history mattered, we would expect insignificant differences between French
colonies and colonies of other countries which imposed French civil law.
To be sure, this test presupposes that the various Continental powers really exported
the same law, or at least that the differences between these colonizers’ variants of French
civil law were small relative to the differences between their other colonial policies. This
is not an innocuous assumption, particularly with respect to countries colonized during dif-
ferent periods. When Portugal and Spain colonized Latin America in the 15th and 16th
centuries, their own legal systems were not yet codified, and hence the laws they imposed
on their colonies were quite different from the codes that the Belgians, French, and also the
Portuguese and Spaniards themselves later brought to Africa. The Portuguese and Span-
ish colonies in Latin America later codified based on French models in the 19th century,
but only after gaining independence - which puts into doubt whether their legal origin can
be considered exogenous. Similarly, it is questionable if it makes sense to categorize cer-
tain European countries, such as Ireland or Belgium, as former "colonies" of England and
France, respectively.14 In our preferred specifications, we exclude these countries. At the
same time, the results with these countries included are qualitatively similar.
Mixed Legal Systems
Some former British colonies are generally considered to be "mixed" legal systems that
combine elements of civil law with elements of common law (e.g., Konrad Zweigert and
Hein Kötz 1998, §16V; Kensie Kim 2010). These countries were initially colonized by a
country which imposed the civil law (e.g. France, the Netherlands, or the Ottomans) and
therefore initially had some form of civil law. Later, England conquered them, but only
partially replaced civil law with common law. Prominent examples include South Africa
and Sri Lanka, which the British took from the Dutch in 1795/6. Overall, there are 11
14We do not categorize Spain or Portugal as former French colonies because French occupation of these
countries was contested, so the French were unable to impose significant changes. Switzerland is a closer
call, but we have similarly not categorized it as a former French colony. Luxembourg was conquered by the
French who successfully imposed the Napoleonic Code, but Luxembourg is coded as a former Dutch colony,
because it was governed by the Duke of Orange from 1815 to 1867.
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former British colonies with mixed legal systems in our sample (cf. table 3.2 below).15
These countries present a combination of British colonial history with a hybrid of com-
mon law and civil law origin, i.e., less than full common law origin. We can therefore test
the respective importance of legal origin and colonial history by comparing former British
colonies with mixed legal systems to other, pure common law British colonies. To the ex-
tent that legal origin is the driver of former British colonies’ advantageous outcomes, mixed
jurisdictions should perform worse. By contrast, if other colonial influences are decisive,
mixed jurisdictions should do as well as other British colonies.
This test is subject to two major qualifications. First, it assumes that while legal influ-
ences of the first colonizer persisted, other influences of the first colonizer were completely
superseded by the intervention of the second colonizer. This is a strong assumption, but
one that, to us, appears to be in conformity with the legal origins literature, which attributes
an extraordinary degree of persistence to legal institutions, tracing contemporary differ-
ences in regulation as far back as to legal developments in the 12th century (Glaeser &
Shleifer 2002; La Porta et al. 2008). By contrast, education or local governance policies
can presumably be changed over a century or more of rule by a later colonial power.
Second, and more problematically, the genesis of mixed jurisdictions suggests two pos-
sible sources of selection bias. Because Britain was the dominant world power from the
late eighteenth century until the twentieth century, countries which the British acquired
may have been particularly desirable places with above-average development potential.
Moreover, among the colonies that were colonized by two consecutive colonial powers,
many, such as Tanzania and Malaysia, did not become mixed jurisdictions but instead fully
adopted the second colonizer’s legal template. Those that did preserve their initial legal-
colonial heritage and became mixed jurisdictions may have been those in which (legal)
institutions were already working relatively well at the time of second colonization. Both
15Botswana, Cyprus, Guyana, Lesotho, Malta, Mauritius, Seychelles, St. Lucia, Sri Lanka, South Africa,
and Zimbabwe. No GDP growth data 1960-2007 were available for Guyana, Malta, and St. Lucia, so these
countries are not in table 3.2. There are some additional countries with mixed legal systems in our sample,
but, because they were not colonized by the British, they do not present clean tests for the relative importance
of legal origin and colonial history. We did not code as “mixed” countries where most of the country had one
legal system, but a region (such as Louisiana, Quebec, or Scotland) had a different legal system. Instead, we
coded such countries according to the legal system which governed the majority of the country.
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of these biases would lead us to overestimate the beneficial effect of the second colonization
by the British, or, by the same token, to underestimate the beneficial effect of the common
law. For this reason, in the discussion below we place more weight on the results derived
with our other empirical tests. Those other results are substantively similar if we code all
mixed jurisdictions as common law countries, as in La Porta et al. (2008).
Tests with other comparison groups?
For various reasons, other group-pairs are problematic for testing the respective influ-
ence of legal origin and colonial history. Most importantly, it is not helpful to compare
countries that were never colonized to one another because, as emphasized in the introduc-
tion, their legal origin is endogenous.
A more subtle but ultimately equally unconvincing use of non-colonized countries
would be the following. To assess differences in colonial policies, one might consider a
difference-in-difference type approach comparing the difference in growth rates between
colonizer A and its colonies to the difference in growth rates between colonizer B and its
colonies. One might claim that (a) the difference in growth rates between countries A and
B (and their respective colonies) reflect differences in the institutional quality of A vs. B,
in particular the relative quality of their legal systems, (b) the difference in growth rates
between the colonizer and its respective colonies reflects the effect of being colonized in
general, while (c) the difference-in-difference reflects differences in colonial policies be-
tween colonizers A and B. For example, in this view, and fully consistent with our thesis,
one could interpret the slow growth of former French colonies relative to France and other
French legal origin non-colonies compared to the faster growth of former British colonies
relative to the United Kingdom (see table 3.2 below) as evidence that, wholly unrelated to
the legal system, French colonization was more harmful than British colonization. This ar-
gument would have to assume, however, that the effect of a certain legal system is the same
in the origin countries and the colonies, or at least that the loss or gain of transplanting the
system to a colony is independent of the system. Neither of these is plausible. In particular,
it has been argued that French civil law was unsuitable for export to developing countries,
either because its formal exhortation of the code was prone to misunderstandings (Merry-
man 1996) or because the more state-heavy French approach failed when transplanted to
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environments with lower civic capital (Djankov et al. 2003).
Another comparison that would be consistent with our thesis but conceptually prob-
lematic is between territories of the former Ottoman empire with civil or common law.
As shown in table 3.2 below, those that had French civil law (Greece, Egypt, Syria) grew
considerably faster, on average, than those that had a mixed system, i.e., had significant
common law influence (Israel, Jordan). This would speak in favor of our thesis. We be-
lieve, however, that the number of observations is too small. In addition, the classification
of Jordan and Israel as former Ottoman territories simplifies their more complex history.
Unlike Greece and Egypt, both were League of Nations Mandates administered by the U.K.
While we classify them as Ottoman colonies because the League of Mandate period was
relatively brief (less than 30 years), the British Mandate period makes comparison with
Greece and Egypt problematic. Syria was a League of Nations Mandate administered by
France, and so more comparable to Israel and Jordan, but comparison among just three
countries has little power.16
We could also compare former Ottoman and U.S. colonies that are now mixed juris-
dictions to former British colonies that are now mixed jurisdictions, and this would again
point to a relatively benign effect of British colonization. But there are only three countries
of the former group in the sample, so we do not pursue this argument here.
There are a number of other colonial/legal origin combinations in table 3.2, but these
contain at most two observations. Moreover, many of them do not present useful variation:
all former colonies of German legal origin were Japanese colonies, and vice versa; and all
former colonies of Scandinavian legal origin were Danish or Swedish colonies.
3.2.2 Institutional channels
Another strategy suggested by in chapter 2 and in Spamann (2010) that we pursue is
to investigate directly possible channels through which legal origin and colonial history
might influence the legal system and, by extension, development in the second half of the
20th century. For this purpose, we compare the explanatory power of a set of variables that
16Moreover, the influx of European Jews into Israel after World War II, which was not caused by any
reason related to legal origin, and which has no parallel for either Jordan or Syria, makes any comparison of
just these three countries problematic.
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proxy for the ostensible core differences between common and civil law to the explanatory
power of variables measuring the impact of other colonial policies. A major advantage of
this strategy is that it is constructive - it not only tests the importance of legal origin and
colonial history in the abstract but points to the concrete mechanisms which might explain
why legal origin and/or colonial history would matter.
We do not have in mind contemporary legislation, which is the basis of most of the
findings reported in La Porta et al. (2008). Such legislation is transitory and open to re-
consideration by the legislature at any time. Rather, we are interested in deeper, persistent
institutional features that might exert influence over long periods of time. These character-
istics might also have the capacity to bring about the systematic differences in legislation
documented in La Porta et al. (2008).
To be sure, we cannot exclude the possibility that there are other deep features of legal
and colonial origin that matter for development. But identifying some aspects that do
matter would considerably enhance the credibility of either theory. Conversely, the inability
to verify empirically a concrete channel through which legal origin or colonial history
influences contemporary outcomes would cast doubt on both.
Legal Origins: Juries, Judicial Independence, and Case Law
Most attempts to explain the documented differences between common and civil law
countries have focused on what are traditionally considered the most fundamental differ-
ences between common and civil law. These are the common law’s more independent
judges, use of juries (Glaeser & Shleifer 2002), and acceptance of case law as a source of
law (Beck et al. 2003).17 To test these theories, we employ a variable for the legal sys-
tem’s acceptance of judicial precedent as a source of law ("case law") circa 1973, which,
following La Porta et al. (2004), we construct from country reports in the International
Encyclopedia of Comparative Law (Réné David et al. 1973-1988); a dummy for the use of
juries in 1960, which we construct from Neil Vidmar (2000); and a measure of constitution-
ally guaranteed supreme court tenure in 1960, which we construct from the Comparative
17The other difference that is often considered fundamental is the civil law’s stronger absorption of Roman
law influences in the course of its development, but it is hard to see how this could in itself influence economic
outcomes today.
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Constitutions Project database (Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg, and James Melton 2010)
and which, following La Porta et al. (2004), we interpret as a proxy for judicial indepen-
dence. The following paragraphs briefly describe the construction of these variables.
Supreme Court Tenure. This variable takes the value 1 if judges of the highest ordinary
court had constitutionally protected terms of indefinite duration in 1960; otherwise this
variable takes the value 0. The highest ordinary court was the highest court to which
appeals of contract and other non-constitutional, non-administrative cases could go. (This
means, for example, that in most former French colonies in Africa, the “Cour Supreme” is
not considered “the highest ordinary court” because it deals primarily with constitutional
issues and impeachments.) The tenure of judges on special constitutional, administrative,
or impeachment tribunals was not considered. If a constitution provided life tenure, or if
it provided no fixed terms for judges and had procedures making removal difficult (e.g.
limited grounds for removal implemented only by legislative supermajorities), this variable
takes the value 1. If a constitution provided for a mandatory retirement age which could
not be waived by the legislature or executive, this variable takes the value 1; if it could
be waived (e.g., Ghana, Guyana, Jamaica, and Nauru), this variable takes the value 0. If
life tenure followed a probationary period (e.g., Burundi), this variable takes the value 0.
Coding was based on the authors’ own reading of full-text constitutions in Elkins, Ginsburg,
and Melton (2010). The relevant constitution was the one in force on December 31, 1960,
or, if the country was not independent or did not otherwise have a constitution in 1960, the
first constitution enacted before December, 31, 1970. The database was accessed between
March 31, 2010 and June 14, 2010.
Juries. This variable takes the value 1 if juries were used for any purpose, civil or crim-
inal, in 1960. It is based on Neil Vidmar (2000). Because this source does not always
specify whether there was a jury in 1960, if this source indicates that juries were used any
time in the period 1940-1970, and there is no indication that the country stopped using ju-
ries before 1960 or started using juries only after 1960, this variable takes the value 1. The
variable takes the value 1 even if juries were only used by a small segment of the popula-
tion (e.g., Kenya, where juries were only for whites), but not if only a very small part of a
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country had juries (e.g., Yemen and Tanzania, even though Aden and Zanzibar had juries).
Since Vidmar’s most complete source is a 1942 survey of Commonwealth countries, the
juries variable may be biased in that Commonwealth countries are more likely to be coded
as having a jury.
Case law. This variable takes the value 0 if case law is not a source of law, 1 if case law
is a minor source of law, and 2 if case law is an important source of law. Coding was based
on the authors’ own reading of the National Reports in The International Encyclopedia of
Comparative Law (David et al. 1973-1988). This variable takes the value 0 if there is no
mention of precedent or case law, or if precedent or case law is mentioned only for the
purpose of stating that it is not a source of law. This variable takes the value 1 if precedent
or case law is said to have a role but that role is not called important or significant (e.g.,
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Italy, Lebanon), if precedent or
case law is said to have only persuasive authority (e.g., Cote D’Ivoire), if precedent or case
law has authority only in special circumstances (e.g. a decision of the full bench) (e.g.,
Iran), if the common law or English law applies but there is no mention of the binding effect
of local decisions (e.g., Antigua, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, Kenya, Zambia), if there is
case law but cases are not published (e.g., South Korea), if Roman Dutch common law
applies (e.g., Zimbabwe), or if the scope of judge made law is very narrow (e.g., Sudan).
This variable takes the value 2 if precedent or case law is a source of law, if stare decisis
applies, or if case law or precedent is binding, influential, decisive, important, or often
followed, even if case law or precedent is not a formal source of law or technically binding
(e.g., Austria, Belgium, France, Netherlands, Spain). Mexico is coded as 2, because much
case law is said to be “compulsory.” This variable is similar to the case law variable of La
Porta et al. (2004) in that it is based on the same source (David et al. 1973-1988), but it is
different in a number of ways, including: (1) greater country coverage; (2) it can take three
values (0, 1, or 2), rather than just two (0 or 1); (3) it considers case law to be an important
source of law if David et al. (1973-1988) says that it is important, influential, or often
followed, even if case law or precedent is not a source of law or formally binding; and (4)
errors, such as the coding of Honduras, are corrected. In any event, unreported regression
results with the original case law variable from La Porta et al. (2004) extended to the
Chapter 3: Legal Origin or Colonial History? 82
same sample are similar (in fact, the estimated coefficient for the original variable is more
negative than in the regressions reported above, and sometimes statistically significant).
Colonial History: Income, Health, and Education in 1960
As discussed above, the various colonizers’ legacies differ in many ways other than
law. We cannot possibly test the impact of all these differences-suitable data do not exist
for many of them, and in any event our list is probably incomplete. Instead, we focus
on those variables that previous work suggests are most relevant for economic growth.
Among the top ten variables identified by Xavier Sala-i-Martin, Gernot Doppelhofer, and
Ronald Miller (2004) as probably relevant for economic growth, three are possibly related
to colonial policy: GDP per capita in 1960, education in 1960, and life expectancy in
1960. Life expectancy in 1960 measures both the colonizer’s public health investments
and climatic and geographic characteristics that affect longevity. It thus measures both
the colonizing powers’ policy about which areas to colonize and the colonizing powers’
governance policies. We do not attempt in this paper to disentangle these two aspects of
colonial policy. We obtain the GDP data from the Penn World Tables 6.3 (Alan Heston,
Robert Summers, and Bettina Aten 2009), and the education and life expectancy data from
Robert Barro and Jong-Wha Lee (1994).
For lack of a principled alternative, we use these same independent variables also with
dependent variables other than growth. Since the connection between those two sets of
variables is less tight, we do not necessarily expect to find any strong results. Nevertheless,
we can at least compare the power of these non-legal control variables to that of the legal
control variables described in the previous subsection.
3.3 Growth
We first illustrate our argument with respect to economic growth before moving to
other dependent variables of interest in section 4. We begin with growth because it is
arguably the ultimate variable of interest and should serve as a summary variable for other
variables, such as financial market development or corruption. Mahoney (2001) has shown
that common law countries grew faster than civil law countries. Similarly, Robin Grier
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(1999) and Graziella Bertocchi and Fabio Canova (2001) have shown that former English
colonies grew faster than former French colonies. Neither, however, tried to measure the
relative importance of legal and colonial origin. We do, and we find that the identity of the
colonizer, rather than legal origin, is the driving factor. Human capital variables plausibly
related to general colonization policy explain nearly all of the variation, while variables
capturing differences between legal families have almost no explanatory power.
Since we are interested in the effects of institutions (implanted during colonial times)
rather than the effects of colonization per se, we use growth data from 1960-2007 rather
than GDP levels.18 We use PPP-adjusted data from the Penn World Tables 6.3 (Heston et
al. 2009) to filter out noise from currency fluctuations.19
As table 3.2 shows, common law countries grew faster than French civil law countries
over the period 1960-2007 (2.01% vs. 1.53%), but the difference is not statistically signifi-
cant (p=0.19 in a two-sided t-test), and other legal origins groups (German, Scandinavian,
Mixed) grew even faster. By contrast, former British colonies grew much faster than for-
mer French colonies (2.30% vs. 0.95%), and the difference is statistically highly significant
(p=0.001). This simple comparison suggests that colonial origin may be more important
than legal origin, and we now investigate the driving force behind these numbers.
18We have also regressed levels of GDP in 1998-2007 on our legal and colonial dummies. The results are
similar to those we obtain here, but mostly not statistically significant. We cannot perform our other analyses
using proxies for colonial and legal origins, respectively, with levels data because the institutions we are
interested in, such as education, health, and the judiciary, are themselves strongly influenced by the level of
development. In the growth regressions, we can partially account for this by controlling for starting GDP;
with the other dependent variables, we account for this by controlling for contemporaneous GDP.
19We use the new and improved RGDPL2 linkage, and the new and improved coding of China.
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Table 3.2: GDP Growth Rates 1960-2007, by Legal and Colonial Origin
(in italics: countries not independent by 1960)
Former French
Colony
Former British
Colony
Former Colony
of Other French
Civil Law
Country
Other Former
Colony
Never colonized Average
French Legal
Origin
Average 0.95
(0.67)
Average 1.79
(1.24)
Average 2.37 1.53
2.93 Morocco
2.66 Italy
2.63 Belgium
2.26 Netherlands
2.14 Congo
2.11 Mauritania
1.63 Gabon
1.25 Mali
1.04 Burkina
Faso
1.04 Chad
0.96 Benin
0.86 Cameroon
0.83 Algeria
0.58 Comoro
Island
0.53 Cote
D’Ivoire
0.1 Togo
-0.03 Guinea
-0.13 Madagascar
-0.22 Senegal
-0.35 Haiti
-0.76 Niger
-1.25 Central
Africa
Belgian colony
0.44(0.44)
-0.03 Rwanda
0.18 Burundi
-3.50 Zaire
Dutch colony
3.10
3.17 Luxemburg
3.54 Indonesia
Ottoman colony
2.64
3.25 Greece
3.09 Egypt
2.06 Syria
Portuguese
colony 1.78
(1.60)
2.88 Cape Verde
2.40 Brazil
1.51 Mozambique
0.56
Guinea-Bissau
Russian colony
3.90
3.90 Romania
continued from
previous column
Spanish colony
1.47 (5.81)
7.08 Equatorial
Guinea
3.03 Panama
3.01 Dominican
Rep.
2.48 Chile
1.97 Mexico
1.94 Colombia
1.76 Costa Rica
1.67 Ecuador
1.47 Guatemala
1.44 Uruguay
1.31 Paraguay
1.21 Peru
1.17 Argentina
1.02 El Salvador
0.99 Honduras
0.59 Bolivia
0.78 Venezuela
-0.47 Nicaragua
3.51 Spain
3.43 Portugal
2.43 France
2.34 Turkey
1.87 Iran
0.63 Ethiopia
Continued on next page
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Table 3.2: GDP Growth Rates 1960-2007, by Legal and Colonial Origin
(in italics: countries not independent by 1960)
Former French
Colony
Former British
Colony
Former Colony
of Other French
Civil Law
Country
Other Former
Colony
Never colonized Average
Common Law Average 2.04
(1.66)
Average 1.92
(1.92)
Average 1.69 2.01
5.24 Hong Kong
5.08 Singapore
4.49 Malaysia
3.82 Ireland
2.9 Trinidad and
Tobago
2.89 India
2.87 Pakistan
2.56 Barbados
2.31 Australia
2.26 Canada
2.12 United
States
1.56 Fiji
1.50 New
Zealand
1.49 Malawi
1.38 Tanzania
1.36 Ghana
0.86 Bangladesh
0.82 Uganda
0.68 Jamaica
0.44 Kenya
0.29 Nigeria
0.11 Gambia
-0.19 Zambia
Australian
colony
1.92 Papua New
Guinea
2.15 UK
1.23 Nepal
Continued on next page
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Table 3.2: GDP Growth Rates 1960-2007, by Legal and Colonial Origin
(in italics: countries not independent by 1960)
Former French
Colony
Former British
Colony
Former Colony
of Other French
Civil Law
Country
Other Former
Colony
Never colonized Average
Mixed Legal
Origin
Average 3.05
(3.29)
Average 1.71 Average 2.00
(1.10)
Average 4.39 2.73
5.67 Botswana
4.28 Cyprus
3.48 Seychelles
3.32 Sri Lanka
3.06 Mauritius
2.67 Lesotho
1.43 South Africa
0.57 Zimbabwe
Ottoman colony
2.66 Israel
0.75 Jordan
U.S. colony 2.44
3.22 Puerto Rico
1.66 Philippines
South African
colony
1.10 Namibia
4.39 Thailand
Continued on next page
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Table 3.2: GDP Growth Rates 1960-2007, by Legal and Colonial Origin
(in italics: countries not independent by 1960)
Former French
Colony
Former British
Colony
Former Colony
of Other French
Civil Law
Country
Other Former
Colony
Never colonized Average
German Legal
Origin
Average 5.52 Average 3.26 4.01
Japanese colony
5.86 Taiwan
5.19 Korea, Rep.
5.14 China
3.60 Japan
2.73 Austria
1.58 Switzerland
Scandinavian
Legal Origin
Average 2.86 Average 2.51 2.65
Danish colony
2.87 Iceland
Swedish colony
2.85 Finland
3.05 Norway
2.32 Denmark
2.15 Sweden
Data sources: colonizer and legal origin: authors’ coding; GDP growth: Heston et al. (2009).
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As discussed in section 2.1 above, the most informative comparison is between for-
mer French colonies and colonies of other French civil law countries (e.g. colonies of the
Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain). These colonies all had versions of the French civil law,
but their colonial histories were different. The former French colonies grew much more
slowly. In fact, the growth rate of former colonies of French civil law countries other than
France is not statistically distinguishable from that of former British colonies (p=0.29) or,
for that matter, pure common law countries (p=0.40).
Another informative comparison is between former British colonies that are pure com-
mon law systems, and those that are mixed. Were legal origin truly important and the
common law beneficial, as the literature often finds, then the pure common law countries
should do better. As table 3.2 shows, however, if anything, the opposite is true: the mixed
legal systems do slightly better.
Inspection of the relevant cells of table 3.2 reveals that neither of these two results
is driven by outliers, and both results hold when we restrict attention to countries that
were still colonies in 1960. (Countries still colonies in 1960 are in italics). We will show
in table 3.3 that the results hold up when controlling for initial GDP per capita in 1960.
Together, these two comparisons suggest that broader colonial policy, rather than legal
origin, influences growth in the post-colonial era. In particular, it appears that French
colonial policy had deleterious consequences for the affected territories. (On other possible
comparisons, see section 2.1.3 above.)
We now add covariates to see if the data tell a plausible story why either legal or colo-
nial origin would matter for growth 1960-2007. In table 3.3 we translate the above tests
directly into a regression framework, using separate dummies for each combination of le-
gal and colonial origins, i.e., for each non-empty cell of table 3.2, and no constant. The
estimated dummy coefficients are the direct equivalent of the simple averages shown in
table 3.2, after controlling for the effect of initial GDP. This makes the results directly
comparable to table 3.2 and allows for arbitrary interaction effects of legal and colonial
origin. Nevertheless, for purposes of comparison, we also present regressions using the
more traditional set-up of separate sets of dummies for legal and colonial origins in ta-
ble 3.4. We perform all our tests on the full sample of independent countries, a subsample
that were a colony at some point between 1750 and 2007 and for which legal origin is
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clearly exogenous, and a sub-subsample that became independent in 1960 or later. We con-
sidered legal origin exogenous unless the country made major changes to its legal system
shortly after independence, as most Latin American countries did.20 We also considered
legal origin endogenous in all European countries. Substantively, the results are the same
in all samples and specifications.
Model 1 of table 3.3 is the direct regression equivalent of table 3.2, except that it con-
trols for initial GDP per capita. We report only the four intercepts corresponding to the
four groups that are relevant for the group-comparison-tests described above. In the bot-
tom rows, we report point estimates and standard errors for linear combinations of coef-
ficients corresponding to group-comparison tests: the difference between former French
colonies and former colonies of French civil law countries other than France (e.g. Spain
and Portugal); the difference between British colonies and colonies of French civil law
countries other than France; and the difference between British colonies with pure com-
mon law and mixed legal systems, respectively. Finally, we show an F-statistic from a
Wald test for the joint null-hypothesis that all the dummies are equal and, where applica-
ble, an F-statistic from a Wald test for the joint null-hypothesis that the coefficients on all
the additional control variables, if any, are zero (i.e., the coefficients on primary schooling
and life expectancy, or on juries, case law, and supreme court tenure, as the case may be).
For the regressions with competing sets of legal and colonial dummies in table 3.4, we also
show separate F-statistics from Wald tests for the joint null-hypotheses that all the legal and
colonial dummies, respectively, are zero.
20Brazil, Haiti, and Spanish colonies in continental Latin America adopted versions of the Napoleonic
Code shortly after independence. While colonies, these countries had uncodified law.
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Table 3.3: GDP Growth 1960–2007, saturated regressions
Full Sample
Former Colonies without Europe, Latin America
Former Colonies Independent after 1960
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
LegalXColonial Dummies
French Law X French Colony -0.31 4.31 -0.20 0.02 5.01 -0.39 -1.23 2.78 -0.78
(1.30) (1.49) (1.57) (2.04) (2.14) (2.51) (3.06) (2.97) (4.20)
X Other Colony 0.49 3.95 0.93 1.14 4.40 1.23 -0.59 1.36 0.12
(1.34) (1.43) (1.58) (2.00) (1.99) (2.43) (2.98) (2.82) (4.01)
British Colony X Common Law 0.72 4.53 0.98 1.16 5.00 1.10 -0.36 2.68 0.92
(1.36) (1.47) (1.50) (2.20) (2.15) (2.47) (3.25) (2.98) (4.07)
X Mixed Law 1.80 4.75 1.86 2.29 5.17 2.03 1.31 3.52 2.08
(1.37) (1.36) (1.51) (2.17) (2.00) (2.46) (3.22) (2.79) (4.23)
Other (legalXcolonial) dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Other Variables
Ln(GDP pc PPP, 1960) 0.17 -1.10*** 0.14 0.10 -1.29*** 0.15 0.26 -1.11** 0.23
(0.17) (0.26) (0.21) (0.27) (0.38) (0.34) (0.42) (0.51) (0.56)
Primary Schooling 1960 1.62* 1.61 -0.21
(0.85) (1.12) (1.30)
Life Expectancy 1960 0.09*** 0.11*** 0.15***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
Supreme Court Tenure 0.73* 0.66 0.38
(0.38) (0.55) (0.88)
Case Law -0.26 -0.39 -0.75
(0.25) (0.38) (0.56)
Juries -0.37 -0.47 -0.65
(0.50) (0.88) (1.28)
Continued on next page
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Table 3.3: GDP Growth 1960–2007, saturated regressions
Full Sample
Former Colonies without Europe, Latin America
Former Colonies Independent after 1960
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
N 110 97 94 66 58 53 45 38 33
R2 0.71 0.82 0.72 0.64 0.77 0.65 0.50 0.69 0.47
Combinations of LegalXColonial
Coefficients
FrenchXFrench – FrenchXOther -0.80* 0.35 -1.13** -1.12* 0.61 -1.62* -0.65 1.42* -0.91
(0.41) (0.36) (0.49) (0.64) (0.61) (0.84) (0.84) (0.73) (1.31)
CommonXBritish – FrenchXOther 0.23 0.58* 0.046 0.017 0.61 -0.13 0.22 1.32* 0.80
(0.41) (0.33) (0.57) (0.66) (0.58) (1.00) (0.90) (0.76) (1.48)
CommonXBritish –MixedXBritish -1.08* -0.22 -0.88 -1.13 -0.17 -0.93 -1.68* -0.84 -1.16
(0.61) (0.53) (0.69) (0.69) (0.64) (0.82) (0.90) (0.80) (1.30)
p-values from
Wald Tests of Joint Hypotheses
All LegalXColonial Dummies 0.00 0.29 0.01 0.01 0.47 0.02 0.15 0.20 0.18
Additional Controls 0.00 0.26 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.60
The regressions are estimated without a constant. OLS standard errors in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗p < .01, ∗ ∗ p < .05, ∗p < .10 (we do not attach asterisks to the estimates for the
LegalXColonial dummies; these estimates only represent group-specific constants).
Data sources: GDP growth: Heston et al. (2009); colonizer, legal origin, supreme court tenure, case law, and juries: authors’ coding; primary schooling (gross primary enrollment
ratio) and life expectancy (at birth): Barro & Lee (1994).
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Table 3.4: GDP Growth 1960-2007, separate legal and colonial dummy sets
Full Sample
Former Colonies without Europe, Latin America
Former Colonies Independent after 1960
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Origin of Law
Common -0.97 -0.21 -0.54 -1.18 0.15 -0.94 0.11 -0.84 -1.16
(0.79) (0.63) (0.97) (1.50) (1.28) (1.74) (1.44) (0.80) (1.30)
Mixed -0.03 -0.09 0.29 -0.23 0.19 -0.016 1.48
(0.72) (0.57) (0.79) (1.34) (1.10) (1.48) (1.44)
German Civil 1.45* 0.43 1.62* 3.41* 2.35 4.00
(0.83) (0.70) (0.89) (2.03) (1.79) (2.60)
Scandinavian Civil -0.046 -0.44 0.63
(0.91) (0.75) (1.04)
Colonizer
Britain 2.05** 0.42 1.83* 2.39 -0.10 2.43 0.90 0.74 2.86**
(0.84) (0.70) (1.02) (1.48) (1.31) (1.80) (1.37) (0.91) (1.26)
French Civil Law Country 0.81* -0.36 1.16** 1.11* -0.61 1.62* 0.62 -1.42* 0.91
Other than France (0.41) (0.36) (0.49) (0.64) (0.61) (0.84) (0.84) (0.73) (1.31)
Other 1.87** 0.92 2.07* 1.34 -0.37 1.04 1.38
(0.87) (0.79) (1.06) (1.69) (1.57) (2.34) (1.66)
None 1.40** 0.47 1.52**
(0.64) (0.51) (0.69)
Other variables
Ln(GDP pc PPP, 1960) 0.10 -1.22*** 0.11 0.06 -1.3*** 0.15 0.16 -1.11**
(0.16) (0.25) (0.20) (0.27) (0.38) (0.34) (0.41) (0.51)
Primary Schooling 1960 1.69** 1.53 -0.21
(0.83) (1.11) (1.30)
Life Expectancy 1960 0.10*** 0.12*** 0.15***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.05)
Continued on next page
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Table 3.4: GDP Growth 1960-2007, separate legal and colonial dummy sets
Full Sample
Former Colonies without Europe, Latin America
Former Colonies Independent after 1960
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Supreme Court Tenure 0.68* 0.66 0.38
(0.38) (0.55) (0.88)
Case Law -0.33 -0.39 -0.75
(0.24) (0.38) (0.56)
Juries -0.40 -0.47 -0.65
(0.49) (0.88) (1.28)
Constant 0.23 4.95*** 0.03 0.33 5.14** -0.39 -0.48 2.78 -0.78
(1.27) (1.43) (1.54) (2.00) (2.13) (2.51) (2.97) (2.97) (4.20)
R2 0.23 0.53 0.27 0.27 0.53 0.32 0.18 0.54 0.24
N 110 97 94 66 58 53 45 38 33
p-values from
Wald Tests of Joint Hypotheses
Legal origin dummies 0.07 0.83 0.24 0.04 0.47 0.20 0.24 0.30 0.38
Colonial dummies 0.11 0.35 0.10 0.21 0.72 0.23 0.62 0.11 0.44
Legal and colonial dummies 0.00 0.26 0.00 0.01 0.43 0.02 0.13 0.20 0.18
Common=Mixed 0.08 0.80 0.20 0.15 0.95 0.26 0.11 0.30 0.38
Additional Controls 0.00 0.26 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.60
OLS standard errors in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗p < .01, ∗ ∗ p < .05, ∗p < .10
Data sources: GDP growth: Heston et al. (2009); colonizer, legal origin, supreme court tenure, case law, and juries: authors’ coding; primary schooling (gross primary enrollment
ratio) and life expectancy (at birth): Barro & Lee (1994).
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As with raw growth rates, when we control for initial GDP per capita there are substan-
tial differences between the different legal/colonial groups. As before, however, broader
colonial history rather than legal origin correlates with growth differences. As shown in
models 1, 4, and 7 of table 3.3, and as in table 3.2, for all the samples, French civil law
countries colonized by countries other than France did economically and statistically signif-
icantly better than former French colonies, and in fact did approximately as well as former
British colonies with common law legal systems. Also as before, former British colonies
with mixed legal systems did even better than former British colonies with pure common
law systems. We obtain similar results with the competing dummy sets in models 1, 4,
and 7 of table 3.4. Controlling for the colonizer, common law jurisdictions are statistically
indistinguishable from civil law jurisdictions; in fact, the point estimate suggests that com-
mon law is associated with lower growth, and common law jurisdictions grew statistically
significantly less than German civil law jurisdictions and mixed jurisdictions (in the full
sample). By contrast, the British colony coefficient is economically significantly positive,
and statistically significantly so in the full sample, implying that former British colonies
grew on average approximately 2% faster per year than former French colonies. Moreover,
former colonies of French civil law countries other than France also grew approximately
1% per year faster than French colonies; this difference is statistically significant except in
the small sample of former colonies independent after 1960 (model 7).
Further confirmation of the importance of colonial rather than legal origins comes
from the additional control variables that we introduce in the other regressions of ta-
bles 3.3 and 3.4. Our proxies for broader colonial policy - initial schooling and life ex-
pectancy - absorb most of the effect of the colonial dummies, and are at least jointly highly
significant, both statistically and economically. The point estimates in models 2 and 5 of
table 3.3 suggest that a one-standard deviation increase in initial schooling and life ex-
pectancy is associated with approximately 1.75% higher annual growth over the period
1960-2007. We showed in table 3.1 above that former British colonies had significantly
higher initial education and life expectancy around 1960. Together, these estimates pro-
vide reason to believe that the colonizing powers had an important differential effect on
post-colonial development through their non-legal policies.
By contrast, we find no evidence that legal institutions imposed by the colonial powers
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had any effect on subsequent growth. The estimates for juries, case law, and supreme court
tenure are neither individually nor collectively significant, with the exception of supreme
court tenure in model 3 of table 3.3. Moreover, two of the three coefficients -case law and
juries - point in the "wrong" direction, i.e., they appear to be associated with lower growth,
the opposite of what the legal origins hypothesis would suggest (cf. section 2.2.1 above).
3.4 Other Dependent Variables: Financial Markets, Un-
employment, and Institutions
We now perform identical tests for other dependent variables. As we will see, the
picture that emerges here is much less clear than for growth, and we have verified that
this is not a consequence of differing samples or different time periods.21 We defer the
discussion of these discrepancies to section 5 below.
While there are potentially hundreds of dependent variables to look at, we focus on the
key areas of the legal origins literature, as summarized in La Porta et al. (2008, Tables 1-3,
panels B): equity markets, debt markets, employment, corruption, and the functioning of
the judiciary. For each of those broad areas, we retain from La Porta et al. (2008, Tables
1-3, panels B) the dependent variable with the greatest country coverage: stock market
capitalization to GDP, private credit to GDP, unemployment, corruption, and the duration
of court proceedings to enforce a debt. Unlike La Porta et al. (2008), however, we are
not constrained by the use of time-variant legal variables to work with data for a particular
time period, and we therefore use the most recent available data with the greatest country
coverage. With one exception, we average the data over a ten-year period to filter out
cyclical noise and to maximize sample size.22
In particular, we average 1998-2007 data on stock market capitalization over GDP,
private credit over GDP, and unemployment from the World Bank’s World Development
Indicators (WDI), and meta-data on corruption (rescaled so that higher numbers indicate
21Running our growth regressions for the period 1998-2007 yields few significant results, presumably
because of the relatively short time window, but the coefficient estimates are similar to those of our baseline
growth regressions.
22In averaging the data, we average over all available years for the particular country in the relevant time
period, instead of dropping countries with missing data for some of those years.
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more corruption) from the World Bank’s World Governance Indicators. In addition, we use
the World Bank’s latest Doing Business Report (World Bank 2008) data on the duration of
enforcing a simple business debt in the year 2006.23 As La Porta et al. (2008) do, we control
in all regressions for the natural logarithm of GDP per capita from WDI, PPP-adjusted and
averaged over 1998-2007. The other independent variables are the same as in the growth
regressions.
While our regression specifications and tests are otherwise identical to those we used
for growth above, we condense the presentation because we now have five times as many
regressions. We report for each regression only the coefficients and test statistics that are di-
rectly relevant for distinguishing legal and other colonial origins in these data, as explained
in section 2 above and applied with respect to growth in section 3. We also report only
results for the conceptually most convincing sample, namely former colonies outside of
Europe and Latin America, for which legal origin is clearly exogenous. We have verified,
however, that results for the full sample are similar.
In addition to single-equation test statistics, we also show p-values from corresponding
joint cross-equation Wald tests using the covariance matrix estimate from unweighted sys-
tem OLS.24 Since we have considerably fewer observations for equity market capitalization
than for our other dependent variables, we also show cross-equation tests for the other four
dependent variables.
23The latest Doing Business data replace those of Djankov et al. (2003) and the World Bank’s first Doing
Business Report (World Bank 2004); as documented in Spamann (2010), they deviate substantially from the
earlier, less sophisticated data.
24Some of these p-values need to be interpreted with caution because they do not account for the direction
in which an estimate deviates from the null-hypothesis. For example, if common law countries perform worse
than French civil law countries in one equation and better in another, these deviations from a null-hypothesis
of no differences do not cancel out but rather add up in the cross-equation test.
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Table 3.5: Other Dependent Variables, Saturated Regressions
Marketcap
/GDP
Credit/GDP Corruption Unemployment Court Duration Joint p-values for equations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1)-(5) (2)-(4)
Panel A – No Additional Control Variables
N 50 103 73 105 100 43 70
R2 0.51 0.56 0.13 0.61 0.11
FrenchXFrench – FrenchXOther 14.35 2.79 -3.78 -0.22 -72.60 0.18 0.02
(32.80) (8.68) (2.83) (0.16) (96.35)
CommonXBritish – FrenchXOther 46.49** 19.62** -3.02 -0.54*** -91.60 0.00 0.00
(22.26) (8.25) (2.45) (0.15) (92.34)
CommonXBritish – MixedXBritish 33.94 -10.29 -5.78** 0.07 -205.93 0.01 0.03
(23.43) (10.76) (2.55) (0.20) (128.73)
p-Values from Wald Tests
All LegalXColonial Dummies 0.47 0.24 0.46 0.09 0.54 0.03 0.19
Panel B – Proxies for Colonial Policy (Education, Life Expectancy)
N 36 62 47 62 61 33 46
R2 0.58 0.66 0.37 0.75 0.18
FrenchXFrench – FrenchXOther 10.81 -9.86 0.82 -0.03 -57.66 0.55 0.28
(60.79) (14.67) (4.11) (0.23) (134.26)
CommonXBritish – FrenchXOther 71.49 0.85 -0.99 -0.11 -83.25 0.32 0.12
(48.04) (13.73) (3.64) (0.21) (126.04)
CommonXBritish –MixedXBritish 41.06 -11.28 -8.72*** 0.11 -219.81 0.01 0.00
(28.90) (14.65) (2.78) (0.23) (142.44)
p-Values from Wald Tests
All LegalXColonial Dummies 0.37 0.98 0.09 0.95 0.70 0.00 0.00
Colonial Policy Proxies 0.07 0.27 0.06 0.02 0.49 0.13 0.21
Continued on next page
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Table 3.5: Other Dependent Variables, Saturated Regressions
Marketcap
/GDP
Credit/GDP Corruption Unemployment Court Duration Joint p-values for equations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1)-(5) (2)-(4)
Panel C – Proxies for Legal Families (Juries, Case Law, Supreme Court Tenure)
N 37 64 48 64 60 32 45
R2 0.59 0.67 0.21 0.70 0.23
FrenchXFrench – FrenchXOther 4.89 12.23 -2.27 -0.51** -74.70 0.65 0.18
(31.53) (12.33) (3.86) (0.23) (116.56)
CommonXBritish – FrenchXOther 5.65 1.82 -2.25 -0.59** -58.37 0.15 0.05
(29.87) (15.41) (4.31) (0.29) (144.77)
CommonXBritish –MixedXBritish 16.24 -22.85* -6.08** 0.10 -221.77* 0.04 0.01
(18.63) (12.81) (2.94) (0.24) (126.72)
p-Values from Wald Tests
All LegalXColonial Dummies 0.78 0.78 0.64 0.50 0.30 0.43 0.00
Legal Family Proxies 0.51 0.01 0.49 0.25 0.51 0.62 0.16
This table only shows linear combinations of coefficients and corresponding OLS standard errors (in parentheses), as well
as p-values for joint hypotheses within and across equations. The full regression specifications of panels A-C are identical
to those of equations (4)-(6), respectively, of table 3.3, with the exception of the dependent variables and the control for
ln(GDP per capita) (1998-2007 from the World Development Indicators, instead of 1960 from Heston et al. 2009). The first
four dependent variables are averaged over the years 1998-2007 and come from the World Bank’s World Development
Indicators (stock market capitalization over GDP, private credit over GDP, and unemployment) and World Governance
Indicators (corruption, rescaled so that higher numbers indicate more corruption); the fifth dependent variable (duration
of enforcing a simple business debt in the year 2006) is from World Bank (2008). ∗ ∗ ∗p < .01, ∗ ∗ p < .05, ∗p < .10
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Table 3.5 shows results from regressions with dummies for the various combinations of
legal and colonial origin, i.e., the equivalent of table 3.3, models (4)-(6). Panel A shows
the regressions controlling only for contemporaneous GDP per capita and legal/colonial
origin. The picture is almost the opposite of what we find for growth. Among French le-
gal origin countries, former French colonies now perform better than other colonies with
French civil law on all five dimensions. Although the individual differences are not statisti-
cally significant, collectively they are, if market capitalization is omitted from the test. The
exclusion of market capitalization is important, because it doubles the sample size. Also
unlike for growth, non-French colonies with French civil law perform much worse than
former British colonies with common law. Among former British colonies, the mixed ju-
risdictions perform better than pure common law countries in some areas but not in others,
and only one of those differences is individually statistically significant (the joint p-value
is 0.01, but it confounds positive and negative deviations).
We get results more consistent with our growth results in panel B, which shows results
from regressions with controls for non-legal colonial policy, namely education and life
expectancy in 1960 (see section 2.2.2 above). These proxies absorb most of the differences
between the various legal/colonial groups, particularly the differences between French and
other former colonies with French civil law; and the differences in average private credit,
corruption, and unemployment between former British, common law colonies and former
non-French, French civil law colonies. By contrast, the differences between common law
and mixed former British colonies are unaffected. The colonial proxies themselves are not
statistically significant except in the unemployment and corruption equations, but this may
be due to the fact that the particular proxies we use are not well-matched to the dependent
variables (see section 2.2.2 above).
The results from regressions with proxies for common/civil law differences, namely
juries, case law, and supreme court tenure (see section 2.2.1 above), are consistent with our
growth results in so far as these legal proxies are jointly insignificant across all equations
and in every single equation except the credit market regression.
We have also run the table 3.5 regressions with competing sets of legal and colonial
origin dummies, i.e., the equivalent of the growth regressions in table 3.4 (models 4-6).
The unreported results confirm those of table 3.5. In particular, across all five dimensions,
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common law is associated with favorable outcomes, while British colonial influence is
associated with unfavorable outcomes. These estimates, however, are statistically insignif-
icant except for market capitalization.
To sum up, we find, for the other dependent variables, mixed jurisdictions perform
on the whole as well as common law jurisdictions, while the legal origins theory would
predict that they do worse. At the same time, unlike for growth and contrary to the colonial
history hypothesis, former French colonies do better for the other dependent variables than
colonies of French civil law countries other than France. Neither proxies for colonial policy
(education and life expectancy in 1960) nor for legal institutions (juries, case law, supreme
court tenure) seem to matter in these regressions.
3.5 Discussion
In order to interpret our results, we first need to reconcile our results for growth with
those for other dependent variables. While the former strongly suggest that colonial history
rather than legal origin explains performance differences, the latter are more ambiguous
and, in part, point in the opposite direction. As already mentioned, we have verified that
the differences are only partially explained by differing time periods and samples.
The discrepancy is puzzling because most economists believe that these other depen-
dent variables - capital markets, labor force utilization, and institutions - are important
for economic growth (see, e.g., for capital markets Geert Bekaert, Campbell Harvey, and
Christian Lundblad 2005), and also that there is a feedback effect from economic develop-
ment to these other variables. We would therefore expect these estimates to go in the same
direction, and the discrepancy, if it is one, is more than the usual statistical outlier that we
would expect when conducting multiple independent tests. Of course, there is no puzzle
to explain if the results for the other dependent variables are simply non-results, i.e., noise.
This is plausible because few if any of the results for the other dependent variables were
statistically significant by conventional standards.
To be sure, the "noise explanation" is ultimately not satisfactory, and calls for additional
work. Another possibility is that common law countries may have negative features which
offset the advantages identified by La Porta et al. (2008) and others. Chapter 2 shows that
Chapter 3: Legal Origin or Colonial History? 101
common law countries have higher incarceration rates and more crime. Similarly, David
Cutler, Edward Glaeser and Jesse Shapiro (2003) find that common law countries have
higher obesity rates. These and other yet undiscovered negative characteristics of common
law countries may counteract the positive characteristics more prominent in the literature.
For the time being, we read the evidence that we find here in conjunction with other
papers that shed light on the respective relevance of colonial history and legal origins.
While we are the first to address the former as an alternative to legal origins, others have
questioned the theory behind the legal origins explanation from different angles. Mark
Roe (2006) points out that much of the evidence of the legal origins literature is drawn
from highly regulatory areas of law, such as securities or conscription, which have no
obvious link to what are traditionally perceived to be the main differences between common
and civil law, such as the recognition of case law and various aspects of civil procedure.
Moreover, Spamann (2010) shows that the best available data on civil procedure (World
Bank 2008) exhibit no measurable differences between common and civil law countries.
Together with the results of this paper, this suggests that non-legal colonial explanations
deserve to be taken seriously as explanations for the observed cross-country differences
between "common law" and "civil law" countries.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we argue that colonial history is a plausible alternative to purely legal
explanations for the empirical patterns documented in the legal origins literature. The
colonial powers not only imposed their legal system but also had other profound influences
on their colonies, including educational policy, health policy, and local administration and
self-government. Empirically, we can show that the identity of the colonizer is indeed a
better predictor of post-colonial growth rates than legal origin, and this is bolstered by our
finding that proxies for broader colonial policy, but not proxies for legal origin, can explain
much of the growth differential between the colonial groups. For other dependent variables,
the results are mixed, pointing to the need for further research.
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